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TAX TRANSIDONS, OPPORTUNISTIC 
RETROACTIVITY, AND THE BENEFITS 
OFGOVERNMENT PRECOMMITMENT 
Kyle D. Logue* 
"[T]he maximal exploitation of present possibilities may often be an 
obstacle to the maximal creation of new possibilities."1 
"Discretion is the enemy of optimality, commitment its ally."2 
INTRODUCTION 
What if the current federal income tax laws were repealed and 
replaced with a simple flat tax? What if the entire Internal Reve­
nue Code (with its graduated rates and countless deductions, exclu­
sions, and credits) were scuttled in favor of a broad-based 
consumption tax? Only a few years ago, such proposals would have 
seemed radical and extremely unlikely to be adopted. But times 
are changing. Calls for a drastic overhaul of the Internal Revenue 
Code have become commonplace, even at the highest levels in the 
tax-policy community.3 In addition, proposals that would replace 
the income tax with a flat-rate broad-based consumption tax have 
received substantial bipartisan support in Congress.4 And many 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1987, Auburn 
University; J.D. 1990, Yale University. - Ed. 
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Mark Killenbeck, Jim Krier, Jeff Lehman, Rick Lempert, Bill Miller, Rick Pildes, Bob 
Rasmussen, Stuart Thiel, and workshop participants at the University of Michigan, New York 
University, and Vanderbilt Law Schools. I received generous research support from the Uni­
versity of Michigan Law School Cook Research Fund. I also wish to thank Michael Graetz, 
Louis Kaplow, Jeff Strnad, and other participants at the Harvard Law School Seminar on 
Current Research in Taxation (Aug. 1994) for comments and suggestions on the initial draft 
of this article. 
1. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONAL­
ITY 10 (1984) (paraphrasing JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS '07 
(1954)). 
2. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government Commit­
ment, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A CHANGING SOCIETY 245-46 (Pierre Bourdieu & James s. 
Coleman eds., 1991). 
3. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABusHKA, THE FLATTAx 1 (2d ed. 1995) (quot­
ing Shirley Peterson, former Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service) ("I would re­
peal the entire Internal Revenue Code and start over. "). 
4. Representative Richard Armey, for example, has proposed a flat tax of 17% to be 
applied only to wages and pension income with an exclusion for investment income. Because 
of the exclusion for investment income, the Armey flat tax is a form of consumption tax. For 
1129 
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commentators believe that Congress is likely to enact some version 
of these proposals in the not-too-distant future.5 
One of the most important issues raised by the prospect of radi­
cal tax reform is that of transition effects.6 Each of the tax-reform 
proposals currently under consideration would eliminate many of 
the deductions, exclusions, and credits that individuals and busi­
nesses have come to rely upon.7 Therefore, unless Congress accom­
panies the repeal of those provisions with some form of transition 
relief (such as grandfathered, phased-in, or delayed effective dates) 
any taxpayer who made an investment in reliance on the prior rule 
will suffer substantial transition losses, losses in the value of pretran­
sition investments. 
As the tax-reform movement gathers momentum, however, so 
too will the pressure on lawmakers not to provide transition relief 
to those taxpayers who will be harmed by the reforms. This pres­
sure comes from several sources. First, Congress may feel the need 
to keep tax reform at least revenue neutral, and transition relief 
may be the most obvious way of saving money.8 Second, politicians 
may see tax reform as an opportunity actually to raise revenue. 
Given the political risk associated with being the congressperson 
the classic description of a consumption-based flat tax upon which the Anney plan is based, 
see HALL & RUBusHKA, supra note 3. Another recent proposal for replacing the current 
income tax with a broad-based consumption tax that has received a great deal of attention is 
the plan put forward by Senators Sam Nunn and Pete Domenici, called the Unlimited Sav­
ings Allowance (USA) Tax System. See H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1995); 
S. 722, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (dubbing the proposal the "USA Tax Act of 1995"). 
Under the USA tax system, taxpayers essentially would be allowed to deduct amounts set 
aside for savings or investment; thus, the USA tax amounts to a cash-flow consumption tax as 
well. For a general discussion of these and other recent flat-tax-refonn proposals, see JoINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, l04TH CoNG., 1ST SESS., DISCUSSION OF ISSUES RELATING TO FLAT 
TAX RATE PROPOSALS (Comm. Print 1995). 
5. See, e.g., Jerry Heaster, Reform, Via a Flat Tax, Seems Likely, KAN. CITY STAR, May 7, 
1995, at G1 (quoting economists and political analysts who view radical tax refonn as highly 
likely in coming years); Sheldon D. Pollack, Consumption Taxes, Flat Taxes, Capital Gains, 
and Other Tax Fantasies, 66 TAX NOTES 577, 578 (1995) ("[T]here is surprisingly strong sup­
port on both sides of the aisle in Congress for both of these very radical tax proposals [cut in 
the capital gains tax and replacement of the federal income tax], and hence, they must be 
considered as viable political options."); David E. Rosenbaum, Washington Memo: Debate of 
Flat Tax Revives Simplicity vs. Fairness Issue, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 1995, at Al. 
6. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 27-28. 
7. For example, the Hall-Rabushka flat tax would eliminate all deductions other than the 
deduction for the costs of inputs used in the production of goods and services, including the 
costs of plant and equipment and employee wages and salaries; it also would eliminate all 
credits and exclusions, other than the personal exemption. See HALL & RABusHKA, supra 
note 3, at 110-11. Note, however, that the flat tax, despite its name, would retain a degree of 
progressivity because of the personal exemption. 
8. See, e.g., Alliance USA, Description and Explanation of the Unlimited Savings Allow­
ance Income Tax System, 66 TAX NoTES 1481, 1487 (1995) ("The USA Tax System is 
designed to replace on a revenue-neutral basis the present corporate and individual income 
taxes . . . .  "). 
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who votes for a tax-rate increase, lawmakers may find the prospect 
of foregoing transition relief an attractive alternative source o� rev­
enue. Finally, lawmakers may be concerned about the perceptions 
of unfairness sometimes associated with the enactment of transition 
rules designed to protect particular taxpayers or groups of 
taxpayers. 
In addition to the political forces pushing against the provision 
of transition relief in tax reform, the dominant view in the legal 
academy also opposes government-provided protection for losses 
arising from changes in the tax laws. Professor Michael Graetz, in a 
1977 article,9 and Professor Louis Kaplow, in a 1986 article,10 pres­
ent an elegant and compelling argument that Congress should 
adopt a policy of providing little or no transition relief to taxpayers 
who suffer losses owing to unanticipated tax-law changes. Put dif­
ferently, under the Graetz-Kaplow theory, tax-law changes (indeed, 
all legal changes) should be made fully retroactive.11 That argu­
ment has gone largely unchallenged in the legal academy.12 More­
over, Professor Saul Levmore, taking the case for retroactive 
taxation one step further, has argued that the occasional, unex­
pected use of retroactive taxation may provide a potentially rich 
and nondistortionary source of revenue for the government.13 
This article challenges the conventional academic wisdom that 
nominal retroactivity is presumptively efficient. In contrast to the 
Graetz-Kaplow view, I argue that, for certain types of t� transi­
tions, the efficient transition policy entails full transition relief in 
the form of guaranteed grandfathering. The article is arranged as 
follows: Part I describes the issue of tax transitions more generally 
and details the Graetz-Kaplow efficiency argument for denying 
compensation to taxpayers who suffer tax-transition losses. Part II 
then defines a category of tax transitions for which the optimal 
9. Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revi­
sion, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, f!J7 (1977) [hereinafter Graetz, Retroactivity]. 
10. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REV. 509 
(1986). 
11. Graetz and Kaplow's positions with respect to tax transitions are discussed in more 
detail infra in Parts I and III. 
12. There have been two noteworthy articles rejecting the Graetz-Kaplow conclusion, at 
least with respect to some types of tax transitions. See Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: 
One-Time v. Periodic An Economic Analysis of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 TAX L. REV. 
305 (1994); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection 
Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 15 VA. L. REv. 1155 (1989). I discuss the 
Goldberg article infra in section V.B.4 and the Ramseyer-Nakazato article infra in section 
III.D. 
13. See Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL Sruo. 265, 273-78 
(1993). I discuss Levmore's arguments infra in section IV.B.2. 
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transition policy probably is full transition relief in the form of 
grandfathered effective dates.14 That category is composed of 
changes in incentive subsidies, that is, tax provisions designed by 
Congress to alter taxpayers' incentives or, more specifically, to in­
duce taxpayers to increase their investment in some socially desira­
ble activity. To make the case for guaranteed grandfathering, I 
exploit the analogy between incentive subsidies and government 
contracts. My argument is essentially this: We generally believe it 
is a good idea for the government to keep its contractual promises, 
those made to private parties and those made to other govern­
ments. Indeed, I argue that in most situations involving implicit or 
explicit government contracts our policy is that the government 
must keep its word. Next, I argue that, for the same reasons we 
follow such a policy in cases of government contracts, we should 
follow such a policy with respect to incentive-subsidy provisions, 
which are analogous to contracts in important ways. As I explain 
below, such a transition policy requires the government to guaran­
tee grandfather treatment whenever an incentive subsidy is re­
pealed or substantially reduced. Failure to make such a 
commitment can produce a number of problems, including an inef­
ficient increase in the default premium that the government must 
pay taxpayers to compensate them for the risk of tax transitions. 
Failing to provide transition relief in such contexts, I argue, 
amounts to opportunistic behavior on the part of the government. 
Part III responds to a number of specific objections that might 
be raised in response to my argument. Part IV then begins to draw 
a distinction between incentive-subsidy transitions and other types 
of tax transitions for which efficiency may require some degree of 
retroactivity. This latter class of tax transitions includes legislative 
corrections of obvious drafting errors and broad-based tax transi­
tions such as an increase in tax rates or a shift from an income­
based to a consumption-based tax. Therefore, Part IV agrees with 
Levmore that some nominally retroactive tax changes can have effi­
ciency benefits, but it suggests that those benefits are easily over­
stated. Finally, Part V concludes with a discussion of some of the 
practical problems associated with designing an efficient 
grandfathering policy, and it provides a brief examination of some 
ways in which the government could precommit to the transition 
policy described in Part II. 
14. Although I sometimes use the language of "efficiency," the normative criterion that I 
apply, as do Graetz, Kaplow, and others, is a version of utilitarianism. See infra note 40. 
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I. TAX TRANSITIONS: THE DEBATE 
A. Defining Transition Losses and Transition Relief 
Any time Congress changes the federal income tax laws and any 
time the Treasury Department or a court alters its interpretation of 
those laws, there typically will be a class of taxpayers who will suffer 
transition losses. Likewise, tax-law changes also give rise to transi­
tion gains; those taxpayers who are holding investments that hap­
pen to benefit from a tax change suddenly experience a windfall 
increase in the value of those investments. 1s 
The classic illustration of these concepts involves the repeal of 
the exemption for interest on state and local bonds. Suppose a tax­
payer were to purchase a long-term bond that paid interest in an­
nual installments with the principal returned at the date of 
maturity. Assuming for simplicity that this investment is risk-free, 
the price of the bond would be equal to the discounted present 
value of the after-tax cash flow that the taxpayer expects to receive 
on the bond. Assume that, at the time of purchase, the interest on 
the bond is exempt from federal income taxation and therefore the 
price of the bond would equal the discounted value of the pretax 
cash flow. Now suppose that, in the following year, Congress re­
peals the interest exemption and provides no transition relief to tax­
payers who made investments in reliance on the old exemption. 
The value of the taxpayer's formerly exempt bond would fall, and 
the taxpayer would suffer a transition loss. Likewise, when the tax 
exemption was first enacted, the lucky or clever taxpayers who hap­
pened to have purchased their bonds prior to the passage of the 
exemption would enjoy transition gains. 
Transition losses can occur whether the new tax law or new in­
terpretation applies nominally retroactively or nominally prospec­
tively.16 Under a nominally retroactive tax-law change, the change 
applies nof only to income that is earned after the date of enact­
ment but also to income earned before the date of enactment. 17 
Under a nominally prospective income tax change, however, the 
new law applies only to income earned after the date of enactment 
15. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 517; Michael J. Mcintyre, Transition Rules: Learning to 
Live With Tax Reform, 4 TAX NoTES 7, 12 {1976). 
16. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 57-60. 
17. For examples of nominally retroactive tax transitions, see infra section IV.A (discuss­
ing the Carlton case) and IV.B.2 (discussing retroactive income tax rate increases). Most 
nominally retroactive tax changes apply only to the year in which the change is enacted. 
Theoretically, a retroactive tax change also could apply to income earned in tax years prior to 
the year of enactment. If the tax change applies to earlier years, however, it might indeed 
run afoul of the Constitution. See infra note 130 (citing sources). 
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and, often, only to income earned after the end of the year of enact­
ment. Under either type of transition, if the change applies to in­
come earned on pre-enactment investments and is not anticipated 
by taxpayers, transition losses will occur.18 Returning to the tax­
exempt-bond example, as long as the repeal of the tax exemption 
applies to future income on bonds that were purchased before the 
repeal was enacted, there will be transition losses.19 
When enacting changes in the federal tax laws, Congress often 
provides some type of transition relief. For example, Congress fre­
quently uses nominally prospective effective dates for new tax laws. 
In some circumstances, however, Congress instead uses phased-in, 
delayed, or grandfathered effective dates. Under a phased-in effec­
tive date, the change is made effective gradually, and the transition 
effects are mitigated (spread over time) but not eliminated. Under 
a delayed effective date, the change is announced upon enactment 
but made effective at some later date. This, too, provides only par­
tial transition relief. Under a grandfathered effective date, how­
ever, the new tax provision applies only to income earned on 
investments that are made after the date on which the change is 
enacted or after some later date.20 Thus, grandfathered effective 
dates essentially provide full transition relief or full protection 
against tax-transition losses. As discussed in section II.C below, 
however, there are circumstances in which a grandfathered effective 
date provides less-than-full relief or more-than-full relief, depend­
ing on whether the grandfather treatment is made transferable. 
Congress is not the only source of tax-transition losses. When 
the Treasury Department issues new regulations or rulings or when 
a court renders a decision interpreting the tax laws, similar losses 
can occur. In the case of rulings and regulations, the Treasury 
Department is authorized by statute to provide transition relief in 
the form of nominally prospective effective dates.21 Absent Treas-
18. Professor Graetz was the first to draw the distinction between effective dates that are 
nominally prospective and those that are nominally retroactive. More important, he was the 
first to demonstrate that applying a transition nominally prospectively will not provide full 
transition relief. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9. Note, however, that, with respect to 
certain types of incentive-subsidy provisions, such as an "up-front" incentive subsidy, a nomi­
nally prospective effective date will provide almost full transition protection against the risk 
of a repeal. See infra section .Y.B.5 (discussing up-front incentive subsidies). 
19. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 57-60. 
20. See DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX PouCY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR 
BASIC TAX REFORM 166-68 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter BLUEPRINTS]; Graetz, supra note 9, at 
60. 
21. Code § 7805(b) empowers the Treasury Department to decide whether to apply regu­
lations retroactively: "The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling or 
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ury Department action, however, the new regulations and rulings 
are automatically applied nominally retroactively.22 
In contrast to the Treasury Department's practice, courts rarely 
proyide transition relief. When a court issues a decision interpret­
ing a tax provision for the first time, the court almost always applies 
its new interpretation retroactively; that is, it applies the interpreta­
tion to the taxpayer in the case before it and typically to all taxpay­
ers who present similar situations, even if their conduct took place 
before the decision. This practice is consistent with courts' long­
standing tradition of applying most judicial decisions 
retroactively.23 
Transition losses and gains, of course, are not limited to changes 
in tax laws. They can be observed in connection with any type of 
legal transition: for example, an increase in airline-safety standards 
or a decrease in federal defense spending.24 Although this article 
focuses on the issue of tax transition losses, much of the analysis 
applies to other legal transitions as well. 
B. Should the Government Compensate Transition Losses? 
The critical normative question raised by tax transitions is 
whether the government should provide transition relief.25 For 
regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect." 
I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1996). 
22. The Treasury Department's discretion under§ 7805(b) has limits. For example, if a 
regulation has existed unchanged for many years, it may acquire the force of law, in which 
case retroactive repeal can come only from Congress. See Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939). See generally Borus I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LoKKEN, 
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsrATE, AND GIFIS 'l[ 110.4.3 (1992). 
23. See Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
("Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years."). See gener­
ally Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993) (surveying the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence on retroactive application of constitutional decisions). The primary 
exception to the rule of retroactive application of judicial decisions comes in the civil context, 
where a "newprinciple of law" can be applied prospectively, if prospective application would 
avoid "injustice and hardship" without unduly undermining the "purpose and effect" of the 
new rule. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971). 
24. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 515-19. 
25. A similar question often has been addressed in connection with nontax legal transi­
tions. For example, much of the literature on the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
includes analyses of the question whether the government should provide compensation to 
citizens whose property it takes for a public purpose. E.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL L. REv. 569 (1984); 
Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation be Paid? 99 Q.J. 
EcoN. 71 (1984); Louis De Alessi, Implications of Property Rights for Government Invest­
ment Choices, 59 AM. ECON. REv. 13 (1969); Wiiiiam A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, 
Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" 
Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269 (1988); Kaplow, supra note 10; Frank Michelman, Property, 
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). 
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many years, the dominant view was that tax changes should not be 
applied retroactively.26 This view apparently derived from the be­
lief that retroactive application would upset taxpayers' "reasonable 
expectations" regarding the tax treatment of investments they had 
made "in reliance" on the prior law.27 This view of tax transitions is 
sometimes referred to as "old view."28 As stated, however, such a 
reliance-based defense of transition relief begs the relevant ques­
tion: Do taxpayers in such situations have a normative claim to a 
government-provided guaranty of the tax treatment of pretransition 
investments? 
Two of the most comprehensive attempts to answer this ques­
tion came in the scholarship of Professors Graetz and Kaplow.29 
Although their analyses are distinguishable in important ways,3o 
their arguments can be usefully combined and summarized as 
follows: 
(1) In the U.S. economy, investors constantly face risks of one 
kind or another (for example, the risk of unanticipated inflation or 
a shift in consumer preferences) which can be called "market risks. " 
Moreover, with a few exceptions, the government typically does not 
provide insurance for such risks. To the contrary, efficient market 
incentives are best maintained if investors bear the full costs of 
their investments. 
26. See Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. 
REV. 1575, 1650 (1979) [hereinafter Graetz, Consumption Tax] ("The politically dominant 
approach to significant changes in the tax law has been to protect the expectations of taxpay­
ers who have 'relied' on existing law; protection typically takes the fom1 of 'grandfathered' 
effective dates.") (citing, among other sources, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 181-215; and 
INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION 187-
92, 198-200 (1978)). 
27. E.g., Committee on Tax Policy, New York State Bar Association, Retroactivity of Tax 
Legislation, 29 TAX LAw. 21 (1975); Note, Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation: A Rule 
of Prospectivity, 84 HARv. L. REv. 436 (1970). 
28. See Levmore, supra note 13, at 267-68. 
29. Other particularly cogent and influential analyses of tax transitions include 
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 159-87; and Mcintyre, supra note 15. 
30. Kaplow concludes that, under certain assumptions, all forms of tax-transition relief 
are generally undesirable. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 615. Graetz, however, would per­
mit the occasional use of phased-in or delayed effective dates, depending upon the magnitude 
of the wealth loss the transition causes. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 87. An­
other distinctive part of Kaplow's treatment of legal transitions is its comprehensiveness. 
Not only does he address transition losses that result from any type of legal transition (not 
just tax transitions), but he also addresses the symmetrical issue of transition gains (or "wind­
fall gains") that result when taxpayers see the value of the pretransition investment rise as a 
result of the legal transition. Kaplow correctly notes that all the same issues apply to windfall 
gains. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 553-55. 
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(2) The risk that the government may change the tax laws in a 
manner that reduces the value of taxpayers' pretransition invest­
ments is not significantly different from market risk. 
(3) Therefore, the efficiency criterion generally supports a tran­
sition policy under which the government does not compensate 
transition losses but instead leaves private investors to bear the risk 
of tax-law changes.31 
Kaplow generalizes this government-risk argument to all forms 
of legal transitions: 
Generally, transitional relief is inefficient because it insulates inves­
tors from the real effects of their decisions, and thus distorts their 
behavior. . . . Given the close kinship between uncertainty regarding 
government policy and market uncertainty, the belief that market re­
sponses are typically more efficient than government relief in address­
ing market risk suggests that transitional relief in mitigation of 
uncertain government policy is likewise undesirable.32 
He also stated that "[the] simultaneous consideration of risk and 
incentives leads to the conclusion that government transitional re­
lief generally is undesirable .... [G]overnment compensation or 
other transitional relief usually is inefficient." 33 Graetz makes the 
government-risk argument in the federal income tax context: 
Recent tax legislation has tended to institutionalize expectations of 
grandfathered effective dates in the tax context. This should be re­
versed. The tax law must remain a flexible instrument of public pol­
icy. When a provision has outlived its usefulness, it should be 
eliminated without the delay and windfall gains inherent in 
grandfathering prior transactions. People should make investments 
with the expectation that political policies may change.34 
The Graetz-Kaplow analysis therefore concludes that it would 
be inefficient for Congress to bind itself to apply a given tax rule to 
a given pretransition investment. Put differently, they conclude 
that it would be inefficient for Congress to commit to a policy of 
providing tax-transition relief in the form of grandfathered effective 
dates.35 Graetz ultimately concludes that, when transition losses are 
31. See generally Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 65-66, frl; Kaplow, supra note 10, 
at 513-14, 520, 527-36. 
32. Kaplow, supra note 10, at 513-14. 
33. Id. at 615-16. 
34. Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at frl. In fairness, Graetz and Kaplow both ac­
knowledge a number of possible exceptions to their general arguments against transition 
relief. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 87; Kaplow, supra note 10, at 616 & n.336. 
35. It is also worth noting that other scholars have come to view the Graetz-Kaplow anal­
ysis as standing for the rejection of grandfathered effective dates in tax transitions. See, e.g., 
Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 12, at 1155 ("[Graetz and Kaplow] argue that Congress 
should abandon [the use of grandfather clauses] as economically inefficient and ethically 
superfluous."). 
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expected to be extremely large, transition relief in the form of 
phased-in or delayed effective dates may be appropriate on effi­
ciency and fairness grounds, but grandfathered effective dates 
should not be used.36 Kaplow concludes generally that tax transi­
tions should be fully, nominally retroactive.37 The Graetz-Kaplow 
view of tax transitions, sometimes referred to as the "new view,"38 
has largely supplanted the old reliance-based view as the dominant 
scholarly paradigm.39 
II. INCENTIVE SUBSIDIES AND THE CASE FOR GUARANTEED 
GRANDFATHERING 
A. The Default-Premium Effect and the Benefits of Government 
Precommitment 
This section discusses a category of tax transitions that, on effi­
ciency grounds, should be accompanied by full transition relief in 
the form of grandfathered effective dates.40 Included in this cate­
gory are repeals of or significant reductions in incentive subsidies, 
which I define as follows: provisions whose primary purpose is to 
alter taxpayers' decisions regarding how they will invest their 
resources. A simple example of such a provision is an incentive tax 
credit, of which there are many in the Internal Revenue Code.41 
Congress frequently uses such credits to increase taxpayer invest­
ment in various types of targeted assets or activities, and such cred­
its usually take the following form: If the taxpayer will increase her 
investment in the targeted asset or activity, some percentage of that 
increased investment will be allowed as a credit against the tax-
36. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 87; Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note 
26, at 1650 ("[N]either fairness nor efficiency demands grandfathered effective dates, but ... 
when the magnitude of change is large, its impact should be reduced through delayed or 
phased-in effective dates rather than grandfathering."); id. at 1653 ("[G]randfathered effec­
tive dates should not be enacted to protect assets that have received favored treatment under 
the income tax."). 
37. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 551-52. 
38. See Levmore, supra note 13, at 268. 
39. See id.; Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 12, at 1155-56. It is worth noting that, 
following Graetz's 1977 article, the Tax Section of the ABA issued a report adopting some of 
Graetz's recommendations. Special Comm. on Simplification, ABA Section of Taxation, 
Evaluation of the Proposed Model Comprehensive Income Tax, 32 TAX LAW. 563, 680-86 
(1979). 
40. The normative criterion applied through most of the article is a loose version of the 
Kaldor-Hicks variety, in other words, maximizing the size of the pie. Thus, typically when I 
say "efficient" or "optimal," I mean Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or optimality. At points in the 
article, however, I also address distributional concerns and how they may conflict with effi­
ciency concerns. 
41. See infra notes 70-78. 
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payer's federal income tax liability. As a result, an investment that 
would not have been profitable to the taxpayer absent the credit 
(that is, it would not have produced a positive net present value) 
becomes profitable once the credit is included. 
An incentive tax credit can be designed in two general ways. 
First, it can be designed as an up-front credit, which means that the 
full amount of the credit applies to the taxpayer's tax liability in the 
year in which the investment giving rise to the credit is made.42 Sec­
ond, it can be designed as installment credit, which means that the 
credit generated by an investment made in one year is spread over a 
number of tax years.43 Note that the selection of the up-front or 
installment design will in turn affect the design of the appropriate 
transition relief. If an installment credit were repealed, for exam­
ple, full transition relief would require a grandfather clause that ex­
empts any investments made before the repeal was enacted or 
before some date prior to the repeal. If, however, an up-front 
credit is repealed, full transition relief simply means applying the 
repeal nominally prospectively, as the taxpayers who relied upon 
the credit already would have received the full tax benefit upon 
which they relied. In other words, an up-front credit has a built-in 
grandfather clause, assuming any repeal is nominally prospective.44 
If Congress were to repeal an incentive tax credit without pro­
viding transition relief (either in the form of a grandfathered effec­
tive date for an installment credit or in the form of a nominally 
prospective effective date for an up-front credit) taxpayers who in­
vested in reliance on the credit would suffer a transition loss. That 
possibility gives rise to the main point of this section: Because tax­
payers who relied on the repealed incentive credit were "burned" 
by the government, future incentive credits would have to be more 
generous (for example, the credit percentage would have to be 
greater) to achieve the same amount of increased investment in the 
targeted asset or activity. This increase in the cost of the incentive 
credit can be understood as a default premium, the premium tax­
payers demand to compensate them for the possibility that the gov­
ernment will repeal the incentive subsidy (in this example, the 
incentive credit) without providing transition relief. 
42. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 587 (coining the term "up front" subsidy). 
43. Goldberg explores the distinction between up-front subsidies and installment subsi­
dies in considerable detail. Although he uses different terminology ("one-time" subsidy and 
"periodic" subsidy, respectively) the concepts are the same as those discussed by Kaplow and 
by me. Goldberg, supra note 12. 
44. See id. at 314; Kaplow, supra note 10, at 587. 
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The size of the default premium will be a function of the taxpay­
ers' subjective estimate of the probability that the government will 
repeal the credit without providing relief. To be specific, assuming 
risk-neutral taxpayers, the value of the default premium will be 
equal to 111-Pt. where Pt is the taxpayers' estimate of P, the 
probability of uncompensated repeal. The size of the premium 
would be greater if taxpayers were risk-averse with respect to the 
possibility of uncompensated repeal. Note that this default­
premium observation would apply not only to the repeal of an in­
centive tax credit but also to the substantial reduction of such a 
credit. More significantly, the default-premium observation applies 
not only to incentive tax credits but also to the repeal of or reduc­
tion in any incentive subsidy. 
I refer to this cost of the government's failure to provide transi­
tion relief has the default-premium effect. To reduce this cost, the 
government must make a credible public precommitment to provide 
transition relief. In Part V below, I discuss several possible precom­
mitment devices that might be used in connection with incentive 
subsidies.45 Of course, although government precommitment to 
transition relief in this context may reduce the default-premium ef­
fect, such precommitment too comes at a cost. More specifically, it 
limits the government's ability to repeal incentive-subsidy provi­
sions without having to provide transition relief.46 That cost of gov­
ernment precommitment (measured in terms of lost policymaking 
flexibility) could theoretically overwhelm the default-premium ef­
fect, in which case, guaranteed grandfathering would be inefficient. 
There are reasons to believe, however, that the reverse is more 
likely to be true (that is, the default-premium effect is likely to 
dominate in this setting): Because the government actually has 
control over the probability of uncompensated repeal (in the ab­
sence of a binding commitment to provide transition relief) taxpay­
ers in such a situation would have a tendency to assign a large value 
to Pt. Thus, even if taxpayers were risk-neutral, they would have a 
tendency to demand a higher default premium than othenvise, that 
is, higher than if the government had no control over P. If taxpay-
45. Interestingly, Professor Kaplow concludes generally that the government should not 
commit to any substantive tax rule. He also concludes, however, that the government should 
commit itself to maintain an optimal transition policy, which he distinguishes from substan­
tive tax rules. Therefore, Kaplow recognizes that there are efficiency benefits to the govern­
ment's precommitment to transition policy; however, he concludes that the efficient 
transition policy is for the government not to provide transition relief. See Kaplow, supra 
note 10, at 557-60. 
46. See infra section IIl.B (discussing the distinction between opportunistic and nonop­
portunistic legal transitions). 
March 1996] Retroactivity and Government Precommitment 1141 
ers were risk-averse, the size of the default premium would be even 
greater. This tendency for taxpayers to assign a relatively high 
value to the likelihood of uncompensated repeal strengthens the 
case for guaranteed grandfathering of incentive-subsidy 
provisions.47 
Professor Graetz asserts that, if taxpayers' estiniate of Pis equal 
to or less than the government's assessment of P (in other words Pt 
< or= PJ, the payment of the default premium (as opposed to 
guaranteed transition relief) would unambiguously be the efficient 
result.48 That conclusion, however, either ignores the possibility 
that the government's precommitment costs could still be less than 
Pt or assumes that the government's precommitment costs are 
greater than Pt. Either way, the conclusion needs further justifica­
tion. In addition, Graetz completely ignores the fact that the gov­
ernment's control over P will cause taxpayers to increase their 
subjective estimate of P. 
In addition to the default-premium effect, if the government 
were to make a practice of actively inducing taxpayers to rely on 
47. Graetz acknowledges the potential efficiency benefits of reducing the default pre­
mium (which he calls an "uncertainty premium") that would flow from the government's 
precommitment to the transition policy I have described. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra 
note 9, at 69-70. He concludes, however, that a commitment by the government to provide 
grandfather treatment would be inefficient; further, he concludes that transition relief should 
be supplied only on an ad hoc basis, depending upon the magnitude of the transition loss in 
question. See id. at fr/. Kaplow, on the other hand, argues that it is always cheaper for the 
government to pay the default premium than to commit to grandfathering an incentive­
subsidy repeal. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 528-29. This argument seems clearly wrong, 
for the reasons discussed in the text. 
Goldberg acknowledges the default-premium effect, and, like me, he regards it as a rea­
son for providing transition relief in this context. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 327. He 
does not explain why it would be efficient to have the government rather than the individual 
taxpayers bear the default premium. Indeed, Golberg's argument seems to be based primar­
ily on an unspecified conception of fairness or horizontal equity. See id. at 323 ("If the sub­
sidy is removed, however, transition rules should be enacted to prevent inequities . . . .  "). In 
addition, Goldberg does not address the issue of government precommitment, and thus he 
does not suggest proposals for facilitating government precommitmeni to an optimal transi­
tion policy. Finally, Goldberg ignores the boundary between incentive subsidies and other 
types of tax provisions and the desirability of transition relief with respect to transitions in 
the latter type of provision. 
Graetz also provides a Rawlsian analysis of what would constitute a "fair" transition pol­
icy from the perspective of the "original position;" he concludes that, "[i]n the context of a 
progressive income tax, the repeal of tax-favored treatment for particular investments would 
be the least likely category of change for which the parties would agree to require grandfa­
ther clauses." Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 85 (quoting JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 199 (1971)). His argument is that the parties most likely to benefit from a rule 
requiring grandfathering of such provisions are likely to be the "most-advantaged persons" in 
society rather than the least. See id. at 86. But this conclusion does not follow. Which class 
of individuals will benefit most from such a transition policy depends upon how the govern­
ment spends the money it saves in reduced default premiums resulting from the policy. That 
money could be distributed to the least-advantaged individuals in society, for example. 
48. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 70. 
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incentive subsidies only to repeal those provisions retroactively, 
there would be additional costs. Tricking taxpayers in that way, 
even if such an approach were efficient in a narrow sense, in a 
broader sense, might be inefficient; for example, it might engender 
distrust and antipathy toward the government.49 That reaction in 
turn could undermine individuals' willingness to comply with the 
tax laws, an ominous prospect in the federal income tax context, as 
the system's success depends heavily upon a large degree of volun­
tary compliance or self-assessment on the part of taxpayers.so 
Given the costs associated with the uncompensated repeal of or 
reduction in an incentive subsidy, an argument can be made that 
the government should attempt to precommit to a policy of provid­
ing guaranteed grandfather treatment for all incentive-subsidy pro­
visions. That is, the government should institute devices or 
procedures designed to hinder violation of this optimal transition 
policy. Below I discuss the considerations that go into designing the 
appropriate grandfather rule and the appropriate precommitment 
device.51 But first, let us consider an important preliminary ques­
tion: Why bother with government precommitment? Why not sim­
ply count on the government to make the correct tradeoff in each 
case between the benefits and costs of transition relief? Truth be 
told, lawmakers already may make this tradeoff optimally, at least 
some of the time. That possibility is discussed further in Part V. 
There may be reasons, however, to doubt the ability of 
lawmakers to maintain an optimal transition policy over time 
purely on an ad hoc basis, without any precommitment devices. It 
may be that lawmakers (like the rest of us) cannot always be trusted 
to make policy decisions that are efficient from a long-run perspec­
tive. For example, they may have a tendency to overvalue policy 
options that produce short-term benefits and delayed or untrace­
able costs.52 Indeed, just such a governmental tendency has been 
49. See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1214-18 {discussing the concept of "demoralization 
costs"). For Graetz's response to Michelman's demoralization cost story, see Graetz, Retro­
activity, supra note 9, at 72 n.77. 
50. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 92 
{2d ed. 1988). There is evidence suggesting that taxpayers are less willing to comply with the 
tax laws if they perceive the system to be unfair or inconsistent. See Steven M. Sheffrin & 
Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer 
Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 193 (Joel 
Slemrod ed., 1992). Goldberg makes a similar point. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 329. 
51. See infra Part V. 
52. There is some psychological evidence to support the notion that humans and other 
animals have a tendency to make decisions that maximize their short-run utility at the ex­
pense of their total utility. See George Ainslie, Beyond microeconomics: Conflict among 
interests in a multiple self as a determinant of value, in THE MULTIPLE SELF. STUDIES IN 
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characterized as a type of myopia.53 As Jon Bister and others have 
observed, such myopia (in governments as in people) can be over­
come best through some form of precommitment device.54 
Therefore, to reduce the default-premium effect (that is, to min­
imize P1), it might be necessary for the government to precommit to 
provide full compensation in the event of.a change in an incentive­
subsidy provision. Whether such a policy would be efficient, again, 
depends upon the tradeoff between the benefits of reduced default 
premiums and costs of reduced government flexibility. Making a 
definitive computation of that tradeoff would be an enormous em­
pirical undertaking, which is well beyond the scope of this article. 
An alternative approach, however, would be to examine how this 
cost-benefit tradeoff has been made in other, similar contexts. In 
the following section, I consider the context of government con­
tracts, where an almost identical cost-benefit analysis arises and 
where we have decided, quite uncontroversially, to precommit to a 
policy of full transition relief. 
B. The Analogy to Government Contracts 
In this section, I develop the analogy between government con­
tracts and incentive subsidies, and I argue that, in both contexts, 
there are enormous efficiency benefits to the government's keeping 
its word. To illustrate this point, let's begin with a generic example. 
Assume that the government determines that some sort of interven-
RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 133 (Jon Elster ed., 1986); Frank A. Logan, Decision­
making by Rats: Delay Versus Amount of Reward, 59 J. OF COMP. & PHYSIOLOGICAL 
PsYCHOL. 1 (1965). This tendency can be understood as a weakness of will or as the applica­
tion of an inappropriate discount rate. 
53. See generally EI.STER, supra note 1, at 87-103. 
54. The benefit of government precommitment is a common theme in constitutional the­
ory. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 9-7, at 470, 473 (2d ed. 
1988) (arguing that the Contract Clause can be understood as a means of precommitting the 
government); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITU­
TIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (reviewing the intel­
lectual history of the government-precommitment problem in political theory). In recent 
years, the benefits of government precommitment and the harms of failing to honor such 
commitments have been formalized by both political theorists and macroeconomic theorists. 
These models attempt to quantify the theoretical efficiency gains associated with the govern­
ment's ability to make binding commitments. The classic article in this area, which gave rise 
to the literature on the "time-consistency" problem, is Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. 
Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. PoL. EcoN. 
473 (1977). The default-premium problem discussed in the text is a version of this time­
consistency problem. In developing the time-consistency model, macroeconomists have bor­
rowed from two literatures (game theory and rational-choice theory) that for years have been 
analyzing implicitly or explicitly the benefits of precommitment by individual and institu­
tional actors. See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 1, at 65-76; THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY 
OF CoNFUcr (1960); Robert H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Max­
imization, 23 REV. EcoN. Sruo. 165 (1955). 
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tion in the market is necessary to alter taxpayers' investment deci­
sions; suppose, say, that the amount of low-income housing 
produced by the unregulated private market is found, for whatever 
reason, to be inadequate. To remedy this situation, the government 
has several policy options. First, ignoring constitutional constraints 
for the moment, the government could simply order private parties 
to build and run the units at their own expense. We can call this 
option uncompensated government coercion.ss Second, the govern­
ment could use coercion but then compensate the parties for their 
costs, an option that we can call compensated government coer­
cion. S6 Third, the government could build and run the additional 
housing units itself. That option we refer to as in-house government 
contracting. Fourth, the government could contract directly with 
private parties to build and run the units on behalf of the govern­
ment, which we shall refer to as outside government contracting. Fi­
nally, the government could enact a law that promised a payment 
(for example, in the form of a tax credit) to any taxpayer who in­
vested in low-income housing and who met certain other criteria. 
The last policy option, of course, is the incentive subsidy. 
Each of these policy options has costs and benefits. And the 
choice of the most efficient (in other words, the most cost-effective) 
means of increasing the level of investment in low-income housing 
will depend upon the circumstances.s7 Consider each policy option 
in turn. Although it may be difficult to identify the specific circum­
stances in which uncompensated government coercion would be the 
optimal tool for increasing the amount of low-income housing, that 
option is at least conceptually available. The same goes for com­
pensated government coercion.ss On the other hand, government 
contracting (both in-house and outside) is often considered an effi­
cient means of achieving policy goals of this sort. The choice be-
55. This is sometimes called "regulation." 
56. This is sometimes called "eminent domain." 
57. Cost-benefit analyses of these policy options are common. See, e.g., Richard La yard 
& Stephen Glaister, Introduction to CoST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 1, 3 (Richard Layard et al. eds., 
2d ed. 1994) ("Three main methods of [government) intervention are . . •  regulation, taxes 
and subsidies, and public direction of what is to be produced, be it via public enterprise or 
purchase from private firms. Each of these types of government activity can be subject to 
cost-benefit analysis . . . .  "). Some commentators argue, however, that the choice among such 
policy options cannot be captured fully in a traditional cost-benefit analysis but instead re­
quire sensitivity to the "cultural" consequences or the "expressive effect" associated with 
each different policy option. E.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences 
of Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REv. 936, 940-41 (1991). 
58. Compensated government coercion might be efficient, for example, during times of 
military or medical emergency, when there isn't time for options three, four, or five to be 
implemented effectively. 
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tween the two requires the government to address the same sorts of 
issues that private firms face when they decide whether to perform 
some function "in house" or whether instead to "contract out."59 
Finally, the incentive subsidy also has its place. If we have de­
termined that the total quantity of some asset or activity is being 
underproduced by the market, it is not difficult to imagine circum­
stances in which an incentive subsidy would be the most efficient 
means of �creasing the amount of the targeted investment. The 
principal purported advantage of using an incentive subsidy is 
that it requires relatively little involvement · or supervision by 
government bureaucrats, and it promotes private, decentralized de­
cisionmaking rather than government-based, centralized decision­
making.60 Similarly, the incentive subsidy might be superior to 
outside government contracting when contracting costs are high. 
Returning to our example, suppose that, after reviewing these 
options, the government determines that the most efficient way to 
achieve its low-income-housing goal is to enter into a written con­
tract with a group of private developers and pay them to build the 
units. Thus, the parties draw up a contract that provides that the 
developers will build the units, and, in return, the government will 
pay the developers the agreed amount upon completion of the pro­
ject. In the absence of contract law to bind the government to keep 
its word, we can imagine that, after the developers have completed 
their part of the bargain and built the housing units, the govern­
ment might decide not to keep its end of the bargain. 
Why would the government do such a thing? Because of 
money. If the government were to renege on the deal, it would get 
to take the money that had been earmarked for the developers and 
59. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in 4 EcoNOMICA 386 (1937). 
60. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Pol­
icy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 705, 715-19 
(1970). Surrey argues that, when it becomes desirable for the government to provide incen­
tive subsidies (which he concedes happens), such subsidies should be provided through direct 
government expenditures rather than through the federal income tax laws in the form of so­
called tax expenditures. Surrey's arguments against the use of the income tax law to alter 
behavior include the following: (a) tax incentives (at least those that take the form of deduc­
tions or credits) disproportionately benefit taxpayers with relatively high incomes and (b) by 
having the expenditures funneled through the tax-writing process rather than the normal 
expenditure process, we run the risk of implementing conflicting policies and of unnecessarily 
complicating the tax code. On the other side of that debate, however, some have argued that 
tax subsidies may be superior to direct subsidies because the former requires less bureau­
cracy than the latter. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Reha­
bilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEXAS L. REv. 973, 1010-12 (1986). 
That particular debate is beyond the scope of this article, and, for now, I remain agnostic 
on the question whether incentive subsidies are provided best through tax expenditures or 
direct expenditures. The framework of this article applies in either case to any type of incen­
tive subsidy, whether it be a tax expenditure or direct subsidy. 
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use that money for some other governmental objective. For exam­
ple, the money could be spent on education or defense or deficit 
reduction; or it could be redistributed to individual taxpayers in a 
way that maximizes total social welfare, for example, it could be 
redistributed from rich real-estate developers to homeless families. 
Thus, there is a sense in which, once the private developers have 
made the sunk investments necessary to build the low-income 
housing units, the socially optimal policy decision might be for the 
government to break its promise. If the government were to break 
its commitment in that way, simply because it decided not to follow 
through with the deal and instead to spend the money on something 
else, it might be characterized as government opportunism. 
If we allowed the government to break its contractual promises 
without having to pay compensation, such a policy would come at a 
high cost in terms of increased default premiums in future govern­
ment contracts and increased disenchantment with the government 
generally.61 As with incentive subsidies, whether those costs would 
outweigh the benefits from the additional :flexibility that is gained 
by permitting the government to disregard its contractual obliga­
tions is an empirical question that I do not pretend to answer with 
any certainty. Nevertheless, consider the following observation: as 
a general rule, we in fact have adopted a transition policy that re­
quires the government in most circumstances either to keep its con­
tractual promises or pay contract damages. That is, we typically do 
not allow our government (federal or state) to break its contractual 
agreements without paying contract damages to the nonbreaching 
party. If an agency of the U.S. government enters into a contract, it 
is subject to general principles of contract law.62 Likewise, a state 
61. According to standard contract theory, the prevention of opportunistic behavior is 
one of the principal functions of contracts and contract law. See RICHARD A. POSNER, Eco­
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 81 (3d ed. 1986) ("Thus the fundamental function of contract law 
(and recognized as such at least since Hobbes's day) is to deter people from behaving oppor­
tunistically toward their contracting parties, in order to encourage the optimal timing of eco­
nomic activity and make costly self-protective measures unnecessary." (footnote omitted)); 
see also John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEOAL 
STUD. 277 (1972) (demonstrating how a legally enforceable contract permits parties to over­
come the prisoner's dilemma and to achieve joint-wealth-increasing cooperation). Professor 
Oliver Williamson has written extensively about how markets can respond to overcome the 
possibility of opportuniStic behavior. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERAR· 
CHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible 
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 13 AM. EcoN. REv. 519 (1983). 
62. See, e.g., Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 
52 (1986) ("[T]he Federal Government, as sovereign, has the power to enter contracts that 
confer vested rights, and the concomitant duty to honor those rights . . . •  " (citations omit­
ted)); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 351 (1935) ("To say that the Congress may with­
draw or ignore [its] pledge, is to assume that the Constitution contemplates a vain promise, a 
pledge having no other sanction than the pleasure and convenience of the pledgor. This 
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legislature will be bound by its contracts, either because of the Con­
tracts Clause in the Constitution,6 3 because of a comparable clause 
in the relevant state constitution, or because of an explicit waiver of 
sovereign immunity. Presumably the principal reason we have 
adopted this policy of holding the government to its contractual 
commitments is that we have determined implicitly that the costs of 
the alternative policy outweigh the benefits of such a policy. What's 
more, that policy is uncontroversial.64 
If the preceding paragraph presents a satisfactory description of 
what justifies our decision to apply contract law to the government, 
Court has given no sanction to such a conception of the obligations of our Government."); 
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934) ("Congress was free to reduce gratuities 
deemed excessive. But Congress was without power to reduce expenditures by abrogating 
contractual obligations of the United States. To abrogate contracts, in the attempt to lessen 
government expenditure, would be not the practice of economy, but an act of repudiation."). 
Note, however, that Congress imposes a clear-statement restriction on its ability to bind itself 
into the future. See Bowen, 477 U.S. at 52 ("[W]e have declined in the context of commercial 
contracts to find that a 'sovereign forever waives the right to exercise one of its sovereign 
powers unless it expressly reserves the right to exercise that power in' the contract." (quoting 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982))). This is sometimes called the 
"unmistakability doctrine." 
The remedy against the federal government for breach of contract has developed in 
stages. Prior to 1855, a citizen with a monetary claim against the United States could seek 
redress only through a private bill introduced in Congress. See Jeremy Travis, Note, Rethink­
ing Sovereign Immunity after Bivens, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 597, 642 (1982). In 1855, Congress 
created the Court of Claims and empowered it to hear claims against the United States 
founded upon any act of Congress or regulation of an executive department or upon any 
express or implied contract with the United States. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, §§ 1, 2, 
5, 24 Stat. 505, 506. Through the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1994), Congress re­
sponded to the inadequacies of the original Court of Claims legislation. The Act added to 
that court's jurisdiction claims founded upon the Constitution and claims for liquidated or 
unliquidated damages not sounding in tort. In addition, district courts were given concurrent 
jurisdiction of any claims under the statute not exceeding $10,000. See 14 CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE § 3657 (1976). Federal law deter­
mines liability under the statute. See Roxfort Holding Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 587, 
589 (D.N.J. 1959) ("[T]he matter of liability of the federal government is to be determined by 
federal law."). 
63. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of states' immunity from suit early in the 
development of American jurisprudence, deciding that the Contracts Clause, U.S. Const. art. 
I, § 10, cl. 1, could defeat a state's claim of sovereign immunity. See Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
For a variety of reasons, the Contracts Clause fell into disuse until 1977. See United States 
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). See generally, TRIBE, supra note 54, at 613-28 
(summarizing the history of Contracts-Clause jurisprudence). 
64. Put in these terms, the notion of eliminating the government's discretion to break its 
contracts seems to be in tension with the general conclusion suggested by the Graetz-Kaplow 
analysis, the conclusion that losses caused by legal transitions, in most cases, should not be 
compensated by the government. As discussed more fully in the following section, however, 
in the case of the government's opportunistic breach of its own contracts, we have identified 
a type of government risk with respect to which the government is unambiguously the least­
cost insurer and a type of transition loss that on efficiency grounds should be compensated. 
But see Kaplow, supra note 10, at n.54 (acknowledging that the government should pay for 
goods and services it uses but failing to generalize the point to all government contracts or to 
other legal transitions). 
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consider what · inferences might be drawn about how we should 
treat incentive-subsidy provisions. Specifically, consider the follow­
ing argument: To the extent (a) we are persuaded that incentive 
subsidies are like government contracts in important ways,6s and 
(b) we are persuaded that, in deciding to make the government gen­
erally subject to contract-law principles, we have made the right 
tradeoff between default-premium concerns and government­
fiexibility concerns, the same general rule that we have adopted 
with respect to government contractual commitments should also 
be applied to all incentive-subsidy provisions. Under this view, 
when an incentive subsidy is repealed or substantially reduced, the 
optimal transition policy would be to provide full transition relief in 
the form of grandfathered effective dates.66 
This argument can be generalized. If we can identify any laws 
or government policies that are analogous to government contracts, 
the same sort of efficiency argument in favor of a binding precom­
mitment to provide transition relief and against government oppor­
tunism can be made. For example, the possibility of opportunistic 
government behavior is a significant problem in the context of 
agreements between sovereign nations. The following hypothetical 
example illustrates the classic problem of one government acting 
opportunistically toward another: 
The government of a developing nation is negotiating with a multina­
tional corporation over an investment project. Eager to have the for­
eign firm undertake the project, it is prepared to offer handsome 
incentives over the life cycle of the investment. The firm remains re­
luctant. It realizes that once its investment is made and the capital is 
sunk, its bargaining strength diminishes rapidly. The host government 
would then be in a position - and have the incentive - to impose 
new requirements (costs) on the firm, which might more than offset 
the original incentives. Under the circumstances, the multinational 
will undertake the investment only if it receives substantially larger 
benefits at the outset. Even then, it will be hesitant to increase the 
scale of the enterprise, even if it is successful, without further induce­
ments. The host government is perplexed: It would like to promise 
65. Note that an incentive subsidy has some of the characteristics of an old common law 
unilateral contract. See Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 2 Q.B. 484 (1892). 
66. Several previous analyses of tax transitions have recommended a similar transition 
policy with respect to incentive-subsidy transitions; however, none of them justifies this posi· 
tion by using the sort of efficiency argument that I offer. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 
176-77; Mcintyre, supra note 15, at 13. In addition, as explained below, there are some im­
portant differences between the incentive-subsidy transition policy that those authors ad­
vance and the one that I advance. 
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that no onerous requirements will be imposed in the future but has no 
way to commit itself or its successor credibly.67 
Thus, the government would benefit from being able to commit it­
self credibly not to act opportunistically. 
Another area of potential government opportunism that does 
not involve government contracts is public-utility regulation. When 
a state regulates an electric utility, for example, there is an implicit 
or explicit understanding that investors in the utility will receive a 
reasonable rate of return, and this rate of return is included in the 
costs that the utility is allowed to recover in setting its rates. Once 
investors have sunk a certain amount into the enterprise, however, 
the state regulatory authority has an incentive to reduce the rates 
that the utility can charge. This example is another extreme form of 
government opportunism. 68 
To summarize, in all of these settings, the default-premium con­
cerns discussed in section II.A are present. In addition, the analogy 
to government contracts discussed in this section would suggest 
that, absent some powerful argument to the contrary, the optimal 
transition rule in those settings would be for the government to 
precommit to provide full transition relief in the event of a change 
in policy.69 
67. Dani Rodrik & Richard Zeckhauser, The Dilemma of Government Responsiveness, 7 
J. POLY. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 601, 602 (1988) (footnote omitted). For a game-theoretic dis­
cussion of precisely this type of government opportunism in the context of utility regulation, 
see Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, Fragile Commitment and the Regulatory Pro­
cess, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 73 (1992). 
68. See Blackmon & Zeckhauser, supra note 67. In future research, I plan to analyze a 
number of specific cases of government opportunism in contexts other than federal income 
tax law and to emphasize the importance of taking into account default-premium effects. For 
example, one prominent instance of government opportunism involves the circumstances sur­
rounding California's Proposition 103, the referendum passed in the fall of 1988 that ordered 
the rollback in liability and certain other insurance rates in California. This referendum gen­
erated an enormous amount of litigation and scholarly attention. See, e.g., Calfarm Ins. Co. 
v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989); Steven D. Sugarman, California's Insurance Regu­
lation Revolution: The First Two Years of Proposition 103, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 683 (1990). 
One could plausibly argue that the insurance companies who were induced to enter the Cali­
fornia insurance markets in reliance on the assumption that the prevailing regulatory struc­
ture would remain in force (a structure that allowed the insurers to charge premiums that 
cover their costs) were victims of opportunism at the hands of the State of California as a 
result of the mandatory rate rollbacks. My concern is that the California voters, in making 
such a radical change in their insurance-regulatory regime, may have failed to consider ade­
quately the default-premium effects. To be specific, query the extent to which California 
voters understood and took into account the possibility that, following the rate rollbacks, it 
would become much more difficult to get insurers to write business in California. 
69. Keep in mind, however, that, with respect to all of these examples (including incen­
tive subsidies and government contracts) if it can be shown that the default-premium effect is 
relatively small, the efficient transition policy may be to provide no transition relief: no 
grandfather treatment, no contract damages, nothing. 
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C. Incentive Subsidies in the Internal Revenue Code 
Tue Internal Revenue Code has for many years contained a 
number of incentive subsidies. Tue Code currently, for example, 
includes numerous incentive credits: the low-income housing 
credit,10 the targeted jobs credit,71 the enhanced oil recovery 
credit,72 the disabled access credit,73 the renewable electricity pro­
duction credit,74 the Indian employment credit,75 the empowerment 
zone employment credit,76 the research credit,77 and the alcohol 
fuel credit,78 to name just a few. Perhaps the best-known example 
of an incentive tax credit is the investment tax credit (IT C), which 
has been used by Congress as an instrument of policymaking off 
and on for many years and which was repealed in 1986.79 Indeed, 
all of the credits listed above were designed expressly by Congress 
to increase the level of taxpayer investment in a specific asset or 
activity. 
In addition to the numerous incentive tax credits, the Code con­
tains many deductions and exclusions that could easily be under­
stood as incentive subsidies. For example, the Code permits 
accelerated-depreciation deductions for certain types of tangible as­
sets that are either used in a trade or business or held for the pro­
duction of income.8° Furthermore, the Code gives taxpayers the 
70. I.R.C. § 42 (1996). 
71. I.R.C. § 51 (1996). 
72. I.R.C. § 43 (1996). 
73. I.R.C. § 44 (1996). 
74. I.R.C. § 45 (1996). 
75. I.R.C. § 45A (1996). 
76. I.R.C. § 1396 (1996). 
77. I.R.C. § 41 (1996). 
78. I.R.C. § 40 (1996). These credits are combined into a general-business credit for the 
purpose of computing how much of each credit will be allowed in a given year and in car­
ryback and carryover years. See I.R.C. §§ 38(b)-39 (1996). 
79. 
The (investment] credit was first enacted in 1962 in connection with that year's liber­
alization of depreciation rules to stimulate purchases of new machinery and equipment 
to bolster a lagging economy. Since 1962, the credit has been utilized as an instrument 
of fiscal policy. The investment credit was increased in 1964, removed in 1966, reinstated 
in 1967, repealed in 1969, reinstituted in 1971, temporarily increased in 1975, "perma­
nently increased" in 1978, reduced in 1982 and repealed once again in 1986. Although 
the repeal of the investment tax credit was used in 1986 to finance a large share of the 
revenue cost of reducing the top corporate tax rate from 46 to 34 percent, its history 
suggests that it would be foolish to regard the investment tax credit as a dead letter for 
the future. 
GRAETZ, supra note 50, at 407. 
80. Taxpayers have long been able to take depreciation deductions to account for the 
"exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)" of assets 
used in a trade or business or held for the production of income. I.R.C. § 167 (1996). In 
1981, Congress enacted the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), which replaced the 
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option to "expense" (that is, to deduct immediately) the cost of in­
vesting in specific types of tangible business property.s1 Taxpayers 
who invest in mines, oil and gas wells, and other natural deposits 
get the benefit of "percentage-depletion" deductions, which can 
produce a large subsidy for such investments.82 A number of provi­
sions in the Code also provide accelerated amortization for specific 
types of investments, for example, the five-year amortization de­
ductions for the cost of pollution-control facilities83 and for certain 
research-and-development expenditures84 and the seven-year 
amortization deductions for certain qualified reforestation expendi­
tures.85 In addition, the home-mortgage-interest deduction,86 the 
charitable-contribution deduction,87 and the exclusion for interest 
received on state and local bonds88 all could be understood as in­
centive subsidies. Indeed, all of these deductions and exclusions (as 
well as the credits listed above) are designed to increase taxpayers' 
level of investment in certain types of assets and activities and thus 
easily can be understood as substitutes for direct government 
contracting. 89 
With respect to any of these tax provisions, the framework of 
this article suggests that Congress should adopt a policy of provid­
ing guaranteed grandfather treatment should the provisions be re­
pealed or substantially reduced. At this point, it might be argued 
that, because every aspect of the tax laws affects taxpayers' incen-
pre-1981 depreciation rules with respect to most tangible property. The accelerated deduc­
tions permitted under ACRS had the effect of increasing the after-tax rate of return on in­
vestment in qualifying depreciable property, thereby giving taxpayers an incentive to 
increase their level of investment in such assets. In fact, when the Tax Reform of 1986 re­
placed the ACRS with the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MA,CRS), one of its 
principal motivations was to reduce the effect on investment incentives. See 2 U.S. TREAS­
URY DEPT., REPORT TO THE I'REsIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECO­
NOMIC GROWTH 154-57 (1984) ("The low or negative effective tax rates on ACRS property 
and the tax deferral resulting from accelerated depreciation allowances distort investment 
decisions in a variety of ways."). See generally GRAETZ, supra note 50, at 392 
("(D]epreciation allowances have long been used to adjust the overall level of investment in 
plant and equipment for fiscal policy reasons."). 
81. See I.R.C. § 179 (1996). A limit is placed on the total amount'a taxpayer can expense 
under § 179 in a given tax year. The current limit is $17,500. See I.R.C. § 179 (b)(l) (1996). 
82. See I.R.C. §§ 611-14 (1996). 
83. See I.R.C. § 169 (1996). 
84. See I.R.C. § 174(b) (1996). 
85. See l.R.C. § 194 (1996). 
86. See I.R.C. §§ 163(a), (h)(3) (1996). 
87. See I.R.C. § 170 (1996). 
88. See I.R.C. § 103 (1996). 
89. For an extensive list of incentive-subsidy provisions, see generally JoINT CoMM. ON 
TAXATION, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., ESTIMATES OF TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 
1995-99 (Comm. Print 1994). 
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tives to some extent, all tax laws can be characterized plausibly as 
subsidies. On this theory, it is misleading to analyze a relatively 
small set of credits, deductions, and exclusions. Fair enough. 
Whenever there is an inconsistency in the tax treatment of two 
comparable types of investments there will be an effect on taxpay­
ers' investment decisions, and that inconsistency can be called a 
subsidy or a penalty, depending on one's starting point. For exam­
ple, the introduction of the income tax itself might alter taxpayers' 
decisions regarding how they will allocate their resources as be­
tween work and leisure. Thus, if the substitution effect were to 
overwhelm the income effect, the income tax could, in a sense, be 
seen as a subsidy of leisure. 
Applying the term "incentive subsidy" to all tax provisions, 
however, would rendeF the term empty and unhelpful. The object 
of this Part of the article is to identify a class of tax laws that most 
resemble a contract because such provisions give rise to the most 
serious default-premium problems. In other words, my contention 
is that incentive-subsidy provisions such as the ones listed in the 
text have much greater incentive effects than do most changes in 
marginal income tax rates, unless the rate changes are extremely 
large.90 
As I explain more fully in Part IV below, however, to the extent 
incentive effects become a problem in connection \vith tax-rate 
changes and other broad-based types of tax transitions, the argu­
ments in this section would apply. In such situations, the use of 
transition relief should at least be considered. In connection with 
changes in income tax rates, however, incentive effects and thus de­
fault premiums are probably not the pivotal issues. Rather, in those 
contexts, distributional concerns become determinative. 
90. It is still true, however, that some of the provisions I have listed as incentive tax 
subsidies might be better characterized differently. For example, the home-mortgage-interest 
deduction may be understood best, not as being designed to induce higher levels of home 
ownership, but rather as being designed to reduce the effective tax rate on middle- and high­
income taxpayers. If the latter characterization is more accurate, and the home-mortgage 
interest deduction is not primarily an incentive subsidy, we may be less concerned about 
default-premium effects in the event of a repeal. In my view, this deduction (more so than 
most provisions) has substantial incentive and distributional effects. 
Interestingly, these two effects are importantly related; they pull in opposite directions. If 
the deduction has a large incentive effect (causing more taxpayers to buy homes) the distri· 
butional effect may be diminished because of the putative tax that results when the tax­
induced in�ntive increase in demand for housing produces higher housing prices. 
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ill. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO GUARANTEED 
GRANDFATHERING 
A. The Graetz-Kap/ow "Government-Risk" Theory 
The conclusion from Part II - that repeals of or reductions in 
incentive subsidies should be accompanied by full transition relief 
- contradicts the Graetz-Kaplow government-risk theory. The 
Graetz-Kaplow position is simple yet powerful: Just as the govern­
ment does not generally provide insurance to private investors for 
market contingencies (such as the risk of a change in consumer 
preferences or a change in the cost of some input), it should not 
irisure them against the risk of change in government policy. Under 
this view, market risk and government risk are indistinguishable, 
and, to achieve efficiency, investors must be forced to take both 
types of risk into account when making investment decisions. 
Therefore, the efficient transition policy in terms of its effects on 
incentives would be to provide no transition relief. Under such a 
policy, taxpayers making investment decisions would be induced to 
take into account not only the risk of changes in inflation rates or in 
the business cycle but also changes in the federal income tax laws. 
Kaplow summarizes this argument as follows: "If one accepts 
the common belief that government relief of market risk is gener­
ally undesirable because the market usually operates efficiently, or 
at least that government relief would be no better, then one should 
conclude that mitigation of government risks is economically unjus­
tifiable. "91 He goes on to argue that "new rules" (such as new fed­
eral income tax provisions) should be made immediately applicable 
to all pretransition investments with no grandfather treatment.92 
Indeed, Kaplow would provide no transition relief whatever, as 
"[t]ransitional relief constitutes an externality that disrupts the mar­
ket's response to the risk imposed by uncertainty concerning future 
government action."93 
Graetz, who made essentially the same point nine years earlier, 
states the argument in a way that stands in stark contrast to the 
thesis of this article. He contends that a taxpayer's reliance on an 
existing tax-law provision cannot form the basis of an argument for 
transition relief precisely because, in Graetz's view, the contract 
analogy is inapt. This analogy supposedly fails because taxpayers 
91. Kaplow, supra note 10, at 535. 
92. See id. at 5fl/ ("[Tax subsidies] typically should not be designed so as to incorporate 
grandfathering, because it generally is undesirable."). 
93. Id. at 551. 
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should take into account the possibility that tax law will change 
over time; therefore, reliance on any given tax provision "should be 
tempered by the subjective probability that the law will be 
altered. "94 
In the context of government contracts and incentive-subsidy 
provisions, however, the Graetz-Kaplow analysis does not produce 
a general rule against transition relief.95 This is because the risk 
that the government will breach a contract or repeal an incentive­
subsidy provision without providing transition relief differs from 
market risks. One of the principal functions served by any contract 
is to allocate risks between the contracting parties. If the agree­
ment is fully and efficiently specified, each of the various risks in­
herent in the transaction will be allocated to the least-cost insurer. 
The least-cost insurer will be either the party who can eliminate the 
risk at lowest cost or, if the loss is unpreventable, the party who can 
most efficiently allocate the unpreventable risk either by purchasing 
insurance or by self-insuring. In addition to allocating risk, how­
ever, the contract serves another important function: to prevent 
either party from acting opportunistically. This function, too, can 
be put in risk-allocation terms; that is, the fully and efficiently speci­
fied contract would allocate the risk of opportunism to the opportu­
nist.96 Thus, applying the Graetz-Kaplow framework, if failure to 
provide transition relief (either in the form of contract damages or 
grandfather treatment) would amount to opportunism on the part 
of the government, efficiency would require that such relief be 
provided. 
B. The Distinction Between Opportunistic and Nonopportunistic 
Legal Transitions 
What if Congress decides to repeal an incentive subsidy nomi­
nally retroactively, but for nonopportunistic reasons? That is, the 
government repeals the provision not because, having induced the 
desired level of taxpayer investment, it now wants to use on other 
projects. Rather, Congress repeals the subsidy primarily because it 
has determined that the subsidy was a mistake from the beginning. 
For example, Congress learns that the targeted investment (low­
income housing, nuclear power, oil-and-gas exploration, or 
94. Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note 26, at 1651. 
95. Below I discuss one type of transition {the mistake case) where the government-risk 
argument, on incentive grounds, may call for no transition relief. 
96. See POSNER, supra note 61, at 79-81. 
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whatever) causes more social harm than good, and therefore the 
subsidy never should have been enacted. 
In the nonopportunism situation (which I sometimes refer to as 
the government-mistake case), the government-risk theory would 
call for a transition policy of no relief because such a policy would 
place the risk of transition losses resulting from nonopportunistic 
changes in policy directly on investors. Kaplow illustrates this con­
clusion with two simple examples, one involving the taking of pri­
vate land for public use and the other involving the banning of a 
product: 
Suppose there is a substantial chance that land will be taken and lev­
eled for a highway and that a product will be found hazardous and 
will therefore be banned. Should these events occur, investments in 
improvements on the land and in manufacturing equipment to pro­
duce the product would be rendered worthless. Accordingly, ex post, 
it might well have been socially preferable for the landowner and the 
manufacturer not to have made the investments in the first place.91 
Note how these examples of legal transitions differ from transi­
tions owing to government opportunism. In the opportunism case, 
it is efficient to place the risk of opportunistic behavior on the op­
portunist; so it is efficient to place the risk of government opportu­
nism on the government. In the case where the government 
discovers new facts revealing that its original decision was a bad 
idea, however, whether the risk of transition losses should be left on 
individual investors to allocate through private markets or should 
be borne by the government via transition relief turns on the an­
swer to the follO\ving question: Who is the more efficient bearer of 
the risk of government mistakes, the government itself or the pri­
vate parties?9S Kaplow provides an elaborate argument for why ef­
ficiency generally requires that government risk be borne directly 
by private parties rather than by the government, to optimize the 
private parties' ex ante investment incentives.99 That argument is 
most persuasive, however, with respect to certain types of situa­
tions. For example, consider the case of the product ban mentioned 
in the quotation above. In that situation, one could quite plausibly 
argue that the product manufacturer should be required to bear the 
risk that its product might someday be banned by the government 
97. Kaplow, supra note 10, at 529 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also id. at 
551, 573 (drawing a distinction between mistake cases, where nominal retroactivity is appro­
priate, and change-of-circumstance cases, where nominal prospectivity is appropriate). 
98. The allocation of the risk of a government mistake presents issues similar to those 
that gave rise to the contract doctrines of mistake, impossibility, and frustration. See 
FRIEDRICH KEssLER ET AL., CoNTRAcrs ch. 8 (1986). 
99. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 536-50. 
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for health-and-safety reasons. After all, it is the manufacturer who 
typically has the best access to information regarding the relative 
safety of the products it plans to produce. Further, we want the 
manufacturer, when deciding whether to manufacture a given prod­
uct, to consider all of the possible health-and-safety issues involved, 
and we do not want the manufacturer to externalize potential 
hazards onto the government.100 Put simply, it is easy to believe 
that a product manufacturer is the least-cost insurer with respect to 
this type of legal transition. 
It is less plausible, however, that taxpayers are the least-cost in­
surers against the risk that the government will repeal a mistaken 
incentive subsidy. In that situation, one would expect the govern­
ment to be the superior insurer; we typically want the government 
to bear the risk that its decision to enact a given subsidy will prove 
to have been a mistake. Additionally, making the government bear 
the risk that the incentive subsidy will tum out to be a bad idea will 
induce lawmakers to engage in a more careful cost-benefit analysis 
before enacting the incentive subsidy in the first place. Thus, the 
government-risk analysis does not unambiguously favor a transition 
policy of no relief in the context of incentive-subsidy transitions 
that are cases of government mistake; it may even favor a transition 
policy of full transition relief in such situations. 
This conclusion is consistent with the treatment of nonoppor­
tunistic government mistakes in the government-contract setting. If 
the government enters into a contract that it later determines to be 
a bad idea, it may decide not to make such contract� in the future. 
It still, however, must comply with the old contract or else pay dam­
ages. That is, contract law applies even when the government 
makes a bad deal. Presumably, our decision to apply such a rule in 
the context of government contracts and to maintain that rule for so 
many years derives from our conclusion (albeit implicit) that the 
least-cost insurer of government opportunism is the government. 
To the extent that the same reasoning applies to the case of 
incentive-subsidy provisions, the optimal transition policy therefore 
is to provide guaranteed grandfather protection, irrespective of the 
government's reason for enacting the change. 
All of the foregoing arguments apply as well when the repeal of 
the incentive subsidy or the breach of a government contract is mo­
tivated, not by the government's discovery of new facts, but by a 
change in the government itself. For example, imagine that Con-
100. See id. 
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gress were initially controlled by one of the dominant political par­
ties, during which time a number of incentive-subsidy provisions 
designed to increase the level of taxpayer investment in certain ac­
tivities (for example, low-income housing or research and develop­
ment) were enacted. Then comes a dramatic shift in the political 
landscape; the minority party gains control of the legislature and 
decides to repeal the newly enacted incentive subsidies. In such a 
situation, the newly constituted legislature, according to the argu­
ment developed in Part II, should be bound to provide grandfather 
treatment to those who invested in reliance on the old incentive 
subsidies, so as to minimize the default-premium effect as well as 
general disenchantment with the government for not keeping its 
promises. This conclusion may be most intuitive in the case of gov­
ernment contracts. If, for example, the old Congress were to enter 
into contracts with private parties or with other governments, the 
new Congress should not be able to terminate those contracts at 
will without providing compensation. As I have already discussed, 
we do in fact require our government to comply with basic contract 
principles even when the there is a shift in political power.101 One 
of the principal goals of this article is to emphasize that point and to 
suggest that the same presumption should be applied to all incen­
tive subsidies. 
Professor Kaplow contends that, when a transition is motivated 
by a change in the government or by a change in the voters' prefer­
ences (which amounts to the same thing), the efficient transition 
policy is indeterminate.102 In one sense, I agree. As argued above, 
whether binding the government to its promises (promises in the 
form of explicit contracts or incentive subsidies) will prove efficient 
is ultimately an empirical question on which there is essentially no 
direct data. However, our decision to adopt such a rule in the con­
text of government contracts is uncontroversial presumably because 
of the default-premium concerns and government-legitimacy con­
cerns discussed in Part II. The same rule should apply to incentive 
subsidies in the tax code. 
101. That the government generally must comply with its contractS does not mean that 
one legislature has unlimited power to bind future legislatures. For example, the Supreme 
Court has long held that a current state legislature cannot contract to constrain a future 
legislature's police power or power of eminent domain. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 
(1880). States, however, frequently enter into contracts restricting their future taxing power. 
These are called tax abatements, and they are a common method by which states compete for 
corporate relocations. See Andy Zipser, Civil War, Round Two, BARRON'S, April 3, 1995, at 
23 (discussing the growing use of tax abatements by states to lure corporations into the state). 
102. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 573. 
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One could plausibly argue that an exception to this transition 
policy should be made in the case of incentive-subsidy transitions 
that are motivated primarily by the desire to redistribute wealth 
from the former beneficiaries of the subsidy to the federal fisc. As 
Graetz puts the point: "Grandfathering a change which is moti­
vated by a desire to increase the tax burden on the class of persons 
who have enjoyed a tax incentive is much like passing a law to re­
distribute wealth and requiring compensation to those from whom 
the wealth was distributed."103 In such a situation, we face a trade­
off between incentive concerns and distributional concerns. 
Again, the government-contract example is instructive. We 
would not generally allow the government to walk away from a 
contract with a private party without paying damages, even if the 
private party is wealthy and the contract damages (instead of being 
paid as contract damages) could be redistributed to more deserving 
souls. Redistribution of that sort usually is done with a broader 
brush, through broad-based tax-rate increases and direct subsidies. 
Such broad-based transitions do not give rise to the same degree of 
default premiums that would accompany an opportunistic breach of 
contract or retroactive incentive-subsidy transition.104 
C. The Slippery-Slope Objections 
Another set of objections to the transition policy of providing 
full relief in cases of incentive-subsidy transitions is based on the 
claim that such a policy contains no logical limits and is therefore 
unworkable. As I argue in this section, however, these objections 
can be resolved by reference to the government-contract example. 
The first slippery-slope objection is this: If one is persuaded 
that the default-premium effect presents a serious concern, why 
should transition relief be provided only to the "nominal benefi­
ciaries" of the incentive subsidy, that is, only to the taxpayers who 
claimed the credit, deduction, or exclusion on their tax returns. 
Shouldn't transition relief be provided to all parties who made in­
vestments in reliance on the subsidy, including those who benefited 
103. Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 82. 
104. Still, Graetz's general point regarding redistributive tax transitions is well taken, and 
it is an important point for those incentive-subsidy transitions that affect large classes of 
taxpayers and that begin to have the characteristics of a nonsubsidy tax transition, such as 
rate increases. See infra Part IV and supra note 9. 
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from the subsidy only indirectly? Professor Graetz illustrates this 
criticism with the following example: 
[I]n the case of an exemption for state and local bond interest, advo­
cates of compensation to losers would compensate only the holders of 
tax-exempt bonds. It has not been suggested, however, that issuers of 
tax-exempt bonds, who may well have structured their financing plans 
on the expectation that exempt status would continue into the future, 
are entitled to continuation of the tax exemption because of their "re­
liance" interest. Nor has it been argued that those who demanded or 
supplied substitutes, on the assumption that the exemption would 
continue, should also be protected. If the fairness of change depends 
upon individual reliance, all persons who might be expected to have 
altered behavior because of a particular tax rule must be protected.ms 
There are a number of responses to this objection. First, it is 
true that indirect beneficiaries of an incentive subsidy can suffer 
transition losses when the subsidy is repealed; it is also true that 
grandfathering the repeal of the provision will not necessarily pro­
vide transition relief for those parties. Therefore, if the incentive 
subsidy has had a desirable effect on the incentives of those indirect 
beneficiaries and an effect that is sufficiently large that Congress 
wants to protect it, transition relief (perhaps in the form of direct 
compensation) may be appropriate. Such a policy would be fully 
consistent with the thesis of this article. What is more likely, how­
ever, is that the incentive benefits are relatively small when com­
pared to the costs of the compensation system that would be 
required. (Imagine the difficulty that Congress would encounter at­
tempting to evaluate the validity of the claims brought for compen­
sation by all the parties who purport to be indirect beneficiaries of a 
given incentive subsidy that is slated for repeal.) Thus, the efficient 
transition policy with respect to incentive-subsidy provisions proba­
bly is full transition relief to nominal beneficiaries of the subsidy in 
the form of grandfathered effective dates and no relief for indirect 
beneficiaries. 
This transition policy would be consistent with the rules that ap­
ply to government contracts. As discussed in Part II, when the gov­
ernment breaches a contract it must pay damages to the 
nonbreaching party. It normally will not be required, however, to 
pay damages to third parties who suffer losses as a result of the 
breach. Under basic principles of contract law, for a nonparty to a 
105. Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note 26, at 1651. 
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contract to recover damages, it must qualify as a third-party 
beneficiary .106 
A second slippery-slope objection to a transition policy of guar­
anteed grandfather treatment is based on the following claim: 
There is no meaningful distinction between incentive subsidies that 
have been enacted and those that have been proposed but not en­
acted. For example, to support his claim that "[i]ndividual reliance 
on the status quo simply will not suffice as a basis for compensation 
or grandfathered effective dates," Graetz offers the following 
hypothetical: 
Consider a situation in which the President announces a program to 
subsidize a certain activity through income tax deductions or credits, 
for example, tax credits for the insulation of homes. Members of 
Congress crucial to the passage of the legislation make speeches em­
bracing the proposal. A company engaged in the manufacture of 
home insulation materials, in reliance on these statements, purchases 
additional machinery to manufacture insulation. If the legislation is 
never enacted and the manufacturer loses, should his losses be com­
pensated or should he be otherwise protected? Does the fact that the 
legislation passes both Houses of Congress but is not signed by the 
President alter the result? Why, then, is the repeal of legislation en­
acted one year earlier thought to present a more compelling case for 
compensating reliance? Should those who failed to invest in insula­
tion on the assumption that the legislation would not be enacted also 
be protected?107 
This argument, too, seems to miss the mark. First, although 
Graetz intimates to the contrary, it may be the case that Congress 
will sometimes want to use public promises of future, yet-to-be­
enacted incentive subsidies as a means of altering taxpayers' incen­
tives. If so, we should consider the costs and benefits of providing 
transition relief to investors who make investments in reliance on 
such promises. However, because of the administrative costs that 
would accompany an effort to identify those who suffered such reli­
ance losses, the optimal scope of transition relief probably is limited 
to compensating those who have made investments in reliance on 
the subsidy only after the subsidy has been enacted. This limitation 
would be analogous to the doctrine of "consideration" in contract 
106. See generally KESSLER ET AL., supra note 98, at ch. 11 (reviewing the law of third­
party beneficiaries). It is worth noting that in recent years courts have been increasingly 
willing to allow claims brought by parties alleging to be third-party beneficiaries of govern­
ment contracts. See id. at 1384-418; see also Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Prom­
ise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985) (connecting 
the development of third-party-beneficiary doctrine in the context of government contracts 
to the rise of "new property" concepts pioneered by Charles Reich). 
107. Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 78. 
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law, which serves the function of providing evidence of the parties' 
intent to be bound.1os 
D. The Analogy to Long-Term and Short-Term Contracts 
Part H's use of the contract analogy and its argument in favor of 
guaranteed grandfather treatnient for incentive-subsidy provisions 
may also be subject to the following attack: Even if one. concedes 
that an incentive-subsidy provision has important characteristics 
that are similar to the characteristics of a government contract, the 
contract analogy itself does not provide an efficiency-based justifi­
cation for guaranteed grandfathering. According to this argument, 
an incentive subsidy that is accompanied by a guarantee of grandfa­
ther protection is akin to a long-term contract; whereas, an incen­
tive subsidy without such a guarantee is akin to a short-term 
contract. In present-value terms, the argument goes, such contracts 
are equivalent. Thus, the effect of transition policies on default pre­
miums is irrelevant to the question whether Congress should prom­
ise to provide transition relief. That question should instead be 
answered on different grounds. 
This argument is derived from the article on tax transitions by 
Professors Ramseyer and Nakazato.109 
[T]hink of tax legislation as a "contract" between investors and the 
state, and consider what the "price" of this contract would be. The 
contractual analogy follows from Congress's offering tax benefits in 
return for taxpayers' agreements to make specified investments. By 
urging Congress to abandon grandfather clauses, Graetz and Kaplow 
argue that the optimal contract is one with a short (and indefinite) 
term: The state promises to keep the tax benefits only until it finds a 
way to improve the law. If the state instead vows to grandfather ex­
isting projects, it adopts a long-term contract: a promise to continue 
the benefits for the life of the project. Note, however, that the price 
of the contract will be the same in both cases. After all, risk-neutral 
investors primarily care about the expected net present value of the 
108. See KEssLER ET AL, supra note 98, at ch. 5. 
109. Ramseyer and Nakazato, it turns out, favor guaranteed grandfather treatment for 
incentive-subsidy transitions but for reasons different from those argued here. They rely on 
the following theory: that a policy of promising grandfathering to those who rely on 
incentive-subsidy provisions would reduce the amount of social resources spent lobbying 
against the repeal of tax subsidies in situations in which such a repeal would be efficient. See 
Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 12, at 1171-72; id. at 1174 ("Under a tax-guaranteed re­
gime, investors will not care whether Congress revokes their tax-favored status; under a tax­
contingent strategy, they will care dearly. Accordingly, under the former they will lobby and 
bribe less than under the latter, and to the extent that happens, society gains."). In this 
article, I ignore the effect of alternative transition policies on lobbying expenditures. 
Ramseyer and Nakazato's arguments with respect to that question, though, seem facially 
plausible and therefore provide another justification for a credible government commitment 
to grandfather any changes to an incentive-subsidy provision. 
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tax benefits they gain from an investment; they will rarely care 
whether Congress packages benefits of equal net value in long- or 
short-term contracts.110 
This argument, however, misunderstands the significance of the 
contract analogy. First, any incentive subsidy that provides benefits 
to taxpayers over a period of years rather than all at once (which I 
have called an "installment subsidy") cannot be akin to a short­
term contract. Such an incentive subsidy is either akin to a long­
term contract (if the government commits to provide transition re­
lief should the subsidy be repealed) or it is not (if the government 
does not so commit). Thus, at least with respect to installment­
incentive subsidies, the relevant question is whether the benefits of 
such a commitment exceed the costs. Part II argues that there is 
reason to believe the answer typically will be "yes." 
Second, if the government were to adopt a policy of zero transi­
tion relief (that is, the law could be changed at any time and the 
change would be made nominally retroactive) such a situation 
would not be analogous to a government contract at all, short-term 
or long-term. It would instead be analogous to an empty, unen­
forceable government promise. Part II illustrates how such 
promises, in the absence of any precommitment on the part of the 
government, would give rise to large default premiums, as taxpay­
ers would come to expect opportunism on the part of the govern­
ment. For reasons that are not fully explained in the article, 
however, Ramseyer and Nakazato implicitly assume that the reduc­
tion in default premiums resulting from a policy of guaranteed 
grandfathering is never greater than the loss of government flexibil­
ity but rather that the two effects are always perfectly offsetting. 
That is extremely unlikely. Indeed, if it were so, in the government­
contract setting, we would generally be indifferent as to whether the 
government kept its contractual promises or not. To the contrary, 
in the context of government contracts, we have decided to assume 
that default-premium concerns trump government-flexibility con­
cerns; hence, the application of contract law to the government. 
IV. OTHER TYPES OF TAX TRANSITIONS 
A. The Correction of Obvious Legislative Errors 
Parts II and III argued that, With respect to the repeal of incen­
tive subsidies, the optimal transition policy would be one that 
promises full transition relief in the form of grandfathered effective 
110. Id. at 1167. 
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dates. It may be efficient, however, to permit an exception to this 
policy in a narrow class of cases in which the repealed or revised 
provision contains an obvious error.111 The exception would take 
the form of the following transition policy: If there is a provision in 
the Code that some taxpayers interpret in a manner that generates 
extraordinarily large tax savings, and if there is strong evidence that 
Congress never intended the provision to be interpreted in that 
manner, then, if the provision is repealed or amended to eliminate 
the taxpayers' aggressive interpretation-, the change will apply nom­
inally retroactively. Thus, taxpayers who take advantage of such a 
provision do so at their own risk, and any tax savings they enjoy 
because of it will be recaptured retroactively if the provision is later 
repealed.112 
Such a rule would increase the incentive for taxpayers (and tax 
counsel) to interpret the tax laws in good faith.113 One might object 
to this policy on the ground that most individual taxpayers are rela­
tively unsophisticated and therefore cannot be expected to distin­
guish the tax loopholes that Congress intends from the ones it does 
not. If that is a substantial concern, the transition policy proposed 
in this Part could be narrowed even further to apply only to situa-
111. The distinction that I draw between obvious legislative error (discussed in this sec­
tion) and government mistake (discussed in section III.B above) is akin to the distinction in 
contract Jaw between the treatment of obvious typographical errors in written contracts and 
the treatment of unilateral mistakes. 
112. Mcintyre suggests something similar to this policy: "When Congress amends the 
Code to correct what is generally regarded as an unintended defect in the statute, no special 
transition rules are justified." Mcintyre, supra note 15, at 13. The transition policy that I 
would apply to corrections of obvious errors, in contrast, would entail a special transition 
rule. It would apply the correction nominally retroactively. Also, Mcintyre does not discuss 
the difficulty of distinguishing transitions that are corrections of obvious errors from those 
that are (to use my term) "opportunistic." Kaplow contends that arguments for an obvious­
error exception of the sort I have described serve merely to illustrate the benefits of his 
proposed rule: nominal retroactivity for all transitions. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 608-09. 
In my view, the obvious-error exception is understood best as an exception, not as a rule. 
113. Note that the Code already contains specific penalty provisions designed to induce 
taxpayers to interpret the tax rules reasonably and in good faith. For example, the tax­
return-accuracy penalty, found in § 6662, imposes a 20% penalty on any portion of an un­
derpayment of tax that is attributable to, among other things, negligence or disregard of rules 
or regulations or a substantial understatement of income tax liability (in the absence of "sub­
stantial authority" for the taxpayer's position). See I.R.C. § 6662(b) (1996). Note, however, 
that no accuracy-related penalty is imposed under this section with respect to any portion of 
the underpayment for which the taxpayer can establish that she had a "reasonable cause" 
and that she acted in good faith. See I.R.C. § 6664(c) (1996). Thus, the accuracy penalties 
would not apply in the context of an obvious legislative error, as I have defined that term. 
That is, when Congress has unintentionally but unambiguously enacted a loophole, there is 
no question that the taxpayer has reasonable cause for her position, as that term is under­
stood by the Service and by the courts. In this section, however, I am suggesting that, 
although taxpayers who take aggressive positions in reliance on obvious legislative errors do 
not risk accuracy-related penalties, if such provisions are then repealed by Congress, the 
repeal should be made nominally retroactive. 
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tions in which the taxpayer can be expected to have sophisticated 
tax counsel. For example, it could be limited to tax transitions af­
fecting corporations. 
Distinguishing error-correction transitions, which will be ap­
plied nominally retroactively, from incentive-subsidy transitions, 
which will give rise to full transition relief in the form of 
grandfathered effective dates, will sometimes present a challenge. 
Still, there may be criteria that can assist in drawing the distinction. 
For example, perhaps there should be a presumption that the error­
correction exception will not apply if the provision being repealed 
has been in effect for a number of years. Thus, if Congress decides 
to repeal a provision that has been in the Code for many years, the 
repeal clearly should not be made nominally retroactive to the ear­
liest years in which the provision was in effect. This gives Congress 
an incentive to make such corrections as soon as the error is discov­
ered. Such corrections occur quite frequently in tax legislation, and 
they are often packaged together in so-called Technical Corrections 
bills. Furthermore, perhaps there should be a rebuttable presump­
tion, if not a guarantee, that such a repeal would be grandfathered. 
In addition, if the Treasury Department issues regulations or the 
Internal Revenue Service issues a ruling interpreting a given Code 
section in a manner consistent with taxpayers' "aggressive" inter­
pretation, and Congress later repeals that section or amends it in a 
way inconsistent with Treasury's interpretation, the repeal should 
not be applied nominally retroactively. Instead, the repeal should 
be grandfathered or at least made nominally prospective. By the 
same token, if the Treasury Department issues an interpretation of 
a Code section that is inconsistent with taxpayers' aggressive inter­
pretation, and Congress later changes the section to close the loop­
hole, there is an even stronger argument for making that change 
nominally retroactive, at least retroactive to the date on which the 
Treasury interpretation was first issued and perhaps retroactive to 
the date of enactment of the original provision. 
Admittedly, enforcing a general transition policy of grandfather­
ing incentive-subsidy transitions while simultaneously maintaining a 
policy of nominal retroactivity for transitions designed to close ob­
viously unintended loopholes will create difficulties. Taxpayers lob­
bying Congress for transition relief in connection with the repeal of 
some provision will inevitably argue that their provision falls under 
the rule rather than the exception. Although drawing lines in some 
cases may prove difficult, the gain from line drawing probably ex-
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ceeds the cost, especially if the exception for legislative corrections 
is kept extremely narrow and is applied only in egregious cases. 
This transition policy for situations involving corrections of ob­
vious legislative errors can be seen in the following example. As 
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress enacted an estate-tax 
provision that was designed to create an incentive for owners of 
corporations (more precisely, for the estates of deceased corporate 
shareholders) to sell their stock in the corporation to the company's 
employees rather than to outsiders or the corporation.114 Thus, the 
provision created a deduction for half of the proceeds of "any sale 
of employer securities by the executor of an estate" to "an em­
ployee stock ownership plan [ESOP]."115 The problem, however, 
was that the provision contained no requirement that the decedent 
have owned the stock in question to qualify for the special ESOP 
deduction. As a result, soon after the enactment of this provision, 
many executors of large estates immediately began purchasing 
stock in corporations that had ESOPs and then immediately resel­
ling the shares to the ESOPs. Because the estates could then de­
duct half the sale proceeds on their estate-tax return, the estates 
were able to reduce their tax burdens dramatically. 
Congress was taken by surprise. It had clearly not intended the 
use of the ESOP deduction in connection with shares purchased 
after the death of the decedent shareholders. Evidence of Con­
gress's surprise can be seen in the contrast between Congress's ini­
tial projections regarding the amount of tax revenue that the ESOP 
provision would cost (approximately $300 million over five years) 
and the later projections, once Congress learned how taxpayers 
were interpreting the provision (upwards of $7 billion).116 There­
fore, in February 1987, only a few months after its enactment, Sena­
tor Bentsen from Texas introduced an amendment to the provision, 
inserting language requiring that, to qualify for the estate-tax de­
duction, the securities sold to the ESOP must have been "directly 
114. See STAFF OF JoINT CoMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CoNG., 2o SESs., TAX REFORM 
PROPOSALS: TAX TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS (ESOPs) 37 
(Comm. Print 1985). See generally United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994). 
115. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2514, amended by Om­
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10411(a), 101 Stat. 1330, 
1330-433 (repealed 1989). 
116. See 133 CoNG. REc. 4145, 4293 (1987). Senator Bentsen stated that "Congress did 
not intend for estates to be able to claim the deduction by virtue of purchasing stock in the 
market and simply reselling the stock to an ESOP . . .  and Congress certainly did not antici­
pate a $7 billion revenue loss." Id. at 4294. 
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owned" by the · decedent "immediately before death." And this 
amendment was passed in December 1987.117 
What is most interesting about this tax transition, however, is 
that Congress made the amendment, which was enacted in Decem­
ber 1987, nominally retroactive to apply to transactions in 1986 as 
well as those in 1987.118 This example of nominal retroactivity is 
arguably consistent with the transition policy described above. It is 
also worth noting the Internal Revenue Service's response to the 
initial enactment of the ESOP provision. On January 5, 1987, only 
a few months after the provision was enacted, the Service an­
nounced that "[p]ending the enactment of clarifying legislation," it 
would interpret · the original provision as if the amendment had 
been included from the start and thus would allow the ESOP de­
duction only for sales of securities that had been owned by the de­
cedent at the time of death.119 Given this announcement by the 
Service, the argument for applying the amendment at least to all of 
1987 is extremely strong. Moreover, if one agrees that the taxpay­
ers' interpretation of the provision clearly was not what Congress 
intended, the argument for applying the amendment to 1986 is 
strong as well. 
It was the constitutionality of this transition rule that was at is­
sue in United States v. Carlton.120 The taxpayer in Carlton had 
taken advantage of the estate-tax loophole created by the original 
ESOP-deduction provision. In December 1986, the estate of Mr. 
Carlton had purchased stock in a corporation only to resell the 
stock two days later to the corporation's ESOP, thereby generating 
a huge estate-tax deduction. Although the taxpayer sold the stock 
to the ESOP at a loss, the transaction produced an enormous profit 
after taxes for the taxpayer once the ESOP deduction was taken 
into account.121 When the Internal Revenue Service, applying the 
amended version of the statute, disallowed the taxpayer's ESOP de­
duction, the taxpayer challenged the constitutionality of the nomi-
117. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10411(a), 
101 Stat. 1330, 1330-432 (repealed 1989). 
118. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10411(b), 
101 Stat. 1330 (repealed 1989). 
119. I.R.S. Notice 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 432, 442. 
120. 114 s. Ct. 2018 (1994). 
121. The purchase and sale of the stock produced a loss, before taxes, of $631,000. How­
ever, applying the ESOP estate-tax deduction, the sale generated tax savings of $2,501,161. 
See 114 S. Ct. at 2021. 
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nally retroactive effective date, arguing that such retroactivity 
violates the Due Process Clause.122 
In accordance with a long line of prior cases upholding the con­
stitutionality of nominally retroactive tax-law changes,123 the Court 
rejected the taxpayer's arguments and upheld Congress's retroac­
tive amendment of the ESOP deduction against the due process 
challenge. Interestingly, in reaching this conclusion, the Court was 
persuaded by the same factors that made this particular tax transi­
tion an appropriate occasion for nominal retroactivity: First, Con­
gress clearly was acting to correct an obvious mistake and was not 
opportunistically repealing an incentive subsidy.124 Second, Con­
gress repealed the provision not long after its original enactment; 
therefore, the retroactive reach of the statute was short. In fact, the 
proposal to amend the provision was made only five months after 
the provision was enacted, and the amendment was enacted less 
than one year later.125 
B. Broad-Based Tax Transitions 
Parts II and III concluded that, with respect to the repeal of an 
incentive-subsidy provision, the optimal transition policy would en­
tail full transition relief. This section addresses what I refer to as 
broad-based tax transitions, that is, transitions that affect a relatively 
broad group of taxpayers and that have a relatively small default­
premium effect. The two specific broad-based tax transitions that I 
discuss are: (a) an increase in federal income tax rates and (b) the 
122. See 114 S. Ct. at 2020. 
123. See infra note 131 (discussing retroactive-tax cases). 
124. 
Congress acted to correct what it reasonably viewed as a mistake in the original 
1986 provision that would have created a significant and unanticipated revenue loss. 
Ther� is no plausible contention that Congress acted with an improper motive, as by 
targeting estate representatives such as Carlton after deliberately inducing them to 
engage in ESOP transactions. 
Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2023. 
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor criticizes the majority opinion for relying on 
the argument that the amendment clearly was intended to correct a legislative "mistake." 
She rightly observes that, at some level, "[e]very law touching on an area in which Congress 
has previously legislated can be said to serve the legislative purpose of fixing a perceived 
problem with the prior state of affairs." 114 S. Ct. at 2025 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This 
argument seems to deny the difference between the repeal of an intended incentive subsidy 
and the repeal of a provision that has entirely unintended and unexpected incentive effects 
on taxpayers. Obviously, I think there is a difference. Moreover, it may be that the Court's 
jurisprudence on retroactive taxation would recognize such a difference as well. The major­
ity's opinion at least suggests that the nominally retroactive repeal of an explicit incentive 
provision would have a greater chance of violating the due-process standard in this context. 
See 1 14 S. Ct. at 2023. 
125. See 114 S. Ct. at 2023. 
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shift from an income-based tax to a consumption-based tax. For 
reasons that are discussed below, these two transitions present a 
type of transition problem that is different from the one presented 
by the repeal of an incentive subsidy. Hence the optimal transition 
policy also may be different. 
1. Income Tax Rate Changes 
When Congress changes the federal tax rates, it sometimes 
makes the rate changes nominally prospective, that is, applicable 
only to income earned after the date of enactment or after Decem­
ber 31st of the year of enactment. Sometimes, however, it applies 
the rate changes nominally retroactively, a practice that in recent 
years has led to a fair amount of controversy. For example, as part 
of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (RRA),126 signed into 
law on August 10th of that year, Congress increased the federal in­
come tax rates of the highest-earning individuals and corpora­
tions.127 Although the enactment of the rate increase itself did not 
get much attention, the effective date that Congress selected ignited 
a :firestorm of controversy. The new 1993 tax rates were made ret­
roactive to the beginning of the year and thus applied to income 
earned before the new rates were enacted and even before the new 
administration had taken office.128 Taxpayers and some lawmakers 
expressed shock and dismay at this use of nominal retroactivity.129 
Although the use of a retroactive effective date in this context is 
almost certainly constitutional, 130 some critics in the popular press 
126. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13001, 107 Stat. 416 (codified at I.R.C. § 1 (1996)). 
127. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13201(a), 107 Stat. 312 (codified at I.R.C. § 1 (1996)). Before 
the RRA, the top marginal rate, after all "phase outs" and "bubble" effects, had been 31 %. 
The RRA in effect added two new marginal rates for individuals: 36% (applied to income 
between $140,000 and $250,000 for married couples filing jointly) and 39.6% (applied to in­
come over $250,000 for married couples filing jointly). See I.R.C. § l(a) (1996). The new 
36% and 39.6% rates have been adjusted for inflation for taxable years since 1994. The RRA 
also added a new top bracket for corporations: 35% for income over $10 million. See I.R.C. 
§ ll(b)(l)(D) (1996). 
128. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13201(c), 107 Stat. 
416, 459 (codified at I.R.C. § 1 (1996)). 
129. See, e.g., 139 CoNG. REc. H6392 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1993) (statement of Rep. 
Ramstad) ("Mr. Speaker, we have all heard the axiom, 'At least we are safe as long as the 
legislature isn't in session.' But it turns out that the American people are never safe. With 
passage of the last tax bill, Congress rolled back the clock to a time it was not even in session, 
to raise taxes retroactively. For the first time in American history taxes were raised retroac­
tive to a previous administration.''); Repeal Retroactivity, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1993, at A14. 
130. The Supreme Court repeatedly has upheld retroactive tax legislation against consti­
tutional challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558 (1986); United States v. 
Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981); Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938); United States v. 
Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937); Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931). According to the 
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on retroactive federal income taxation, to sur-
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nevertheless questioned the constitutionality of such a practice.131 
Moreover, retroactive taxation generally elicits a strong negative 
reaction from most taxpayers.132 Despite the controversy, however, 
the retroactive rate increase in 1993 was not without precedent. 
The Revenue Act of 1938, which was enacted on May 28, 1938 and 
which raised the top individual income tax rate from fifty-five to 
seventy-five percent, was made applicable to tax years beginning 
after December 31, 1938.133 Likewise, the Revenue Act of 1944, 
passed on May 29, 1944, which raised the top individual rate from 
seventy-five to ninety-one percent and which substantially reduced 
the income threshold subject to the top rate, was applied retroac­
tively to the beginning of 1944.134 
Whether a tax-rate increase is applied nominally prospectively 
or nominally retroactively, however, some taxpayers will suffer 
losses in the value of investments made in reliance on the old rates. 
Thus these questions arise: What is the optimal transition policy 
with respect to such losses? Should transition relief be provided? 
If so, in what form? Unlike the incentive-subsidy context, where a 
strong case can be made for always providing grandfathered eff ec-
vive a due process challenge Congress's decision to apply a tax change retroactively need 
only pass the "rational-basis" test See United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994); see 
also infra section IV.B.1 (describing earlier retroactive rate increases). 
131. See, e.g., Stephen C. Glazier, Tax Bill: Retroactive, Unconstitutional . . . , WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 5, 1993, at A12 (asserting that a retroactive rate change was unconstitutional). 
132. See Levmore, supra note 13, at 265 ("[R]etroactive taxation . . .  is generally regarded 
as abhorrent, unwise, and even illegal."). We are unlikely to see any additional retroactive 
rate increases from Congress in the near future. In January 1995, the House of Representa­
tives adopted a change to its rules that prevents consideration of a "bill, joint resolution, 
amendment, or conference report carrying a retroactive Federal income tax rate increase." 
H. Res. 6, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106(b) (1995). Before the adoption of that new House 
rule, a number of proposals were introduced that similarly would have limited Congress's 
ability to change tax provisions retroactively. See, e.g., H.R. 3024, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1993) (proposing the elimination of the retroactive tax increases in the RRA); H.R.J. Res. 
258, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing an amendment to the Constitution outlawing 
retroactive tax increases); H.R.J. Res. 256, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing an amend­
ment to the Constitution to prohibit federal laws from imposing liability for conduct arising 
before enactment date); H.R. Res. 247, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (establishing a point of 
order under House rules against consideration of measures that contain retroactive tax in­
creases). The relevant language of Resolution 258 reads as follows: 
Section 1. In the case of any provision of law which modifies the tax laws of the 
United States and which results in increased revenues to the United States -
(1) no such modification of any income tax shall apply to any taxable year beginning 
before the date of the enactment of such modification, and 
(2) no such modification of any excise tax shall apply to any event occurring before 
the date of the enactment of such modification. 
H.R.J. Res. 258, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1993). 
133. See Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, 52 Stat. 447 (superceded by I.R.C. 
1939). 
134. See Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-315, 58 Stat. 231 (superceded 
by I.R.C. 1954). These rates do not include the small surtax on "normal income." 
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tive dates, the optimal policy in the context of a broad-based rate 
increase is less clear and seems to tum on a slightly different mix of 
issues. 
On a practical level, the use of grandfathered effective dates for 
a broad-based rate increase is probably out of the question, for sev­
eral reasons. First, identifying all of the individual investments that 
were made in reliance on the old tax rates and that would therefore 
be entitled to grandfather treatment would be impossible. Second, 
providing grandfather treatment to everyone who made any type of 
investment before the rate change (whether their decision was in­
fluenced by expected tax rates or not) would amount to a policy 
forbidding any changes in income tax rates. It is hard to imagine 
that such a policy would be optimal. 
On a theoretical level, the very idea of providing transition re­
lief for the losses caused by an income tax rate increase is problem­
atic. When Congress adopts a given rate structure, it generally has 
two principal purposes in mind: (a) to raise enough money to fund 
the level of government services that taxpayers want (whether 
those services be public goods or transfer payments) and (b) to allo­
cate the cost of those services across taxpayers in a way that is con­
sidered fair. Thus, when Congress changes the rate structure, it has 
determined either that a different level of revenue is needed or that 
a different allocation of the tax burden is appropriate or both. As a 
consequence, to provide transition relief for the transition losses 
caused by a rate increase would directly contradict Congress's prior 
determination regarding the necessary level of revenue and the ap­
propriate distribution of the tax burden.13s 
For the reasons just described, the use of grandfathered eff ec­
tive dates in the context of broad-based rate increases would almost 
certainly be inefficient. The same would be true of a newly enacted 
broad-based tax. But that is only the start of the inquiry. The 
choice of the optimal effective date (nominally retroactive, nomi­
nally prospective, phased-in, or delayed) is much less clear. The 
answer depends upon whether those transition devices are neces­
sary or helpful in implementing Congress's policy decisions regard­
ing the optimal tradeoff between the goals of raising revenue, 
obtaining the optimal distribution of the tax burden, and avoiding 
harmful incentive effects. Consider the example of an increase in 
the top marginal tax rates for individuals. Such a change could 
135. Both Graetz and Kaplow make similar observations regarding tax transitions that 
are motivated by distributional concerns. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 82; 
Kaplow, s'/,pra note 10, at 519. 
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have two general purposes: (a) to raise funds to put toward reduc­
ing the federal deficit or to spend on some new government service 
and (b) to allocate this additional cost to relatively high-income in­
dividuals.136 In addition, this change could also have undesired in­
cidental incentive effects. For example, it could lead some 
individuals to substitute leisure for work because the after-tax re­
turn from working is reduced by the change.137 Not only in choos­
ing the size and the structure of the rate increase itself, but also, in 
deciding whether to use nominally prospective, phased-in, or 
delayed effective dates, Congress will have to balance all of these 
effects to achieve the optimal result. 
2. Nominally Retroactive Rate Increases: Bolts From the Blue 
So when, if ever, would it be efficient for Congress to apply a 
tax-rate increase nominally retroactively? A retroactive rate in­
crease could be efficient if it comes as a surprise to taxpayers. In 
fact, to the extent taxpayers do not anticipate the retroactive effec­
tive date, a nominally retroactive rate increase will produce greater 
allocative efficiency than a nominally prospective rate increase 
136. In his 1993 State of the Union Address, President Clinton justified the 1993 rate 
increase for high-earning individuals and corporations by emphasizing the need to distribute 
the burden of paying off the deficit fairly across all taxpayers. See Ruth Marcus & Ann 
Devroy, Asking Americans to "Face Facts," Clinton Presents Plan to Raise Taxes, Cut Deficit, 
WASH. PoST, Feb. 18, 1993, at Al. 
137. Note also that a tax-rate increase can, under certain assumptions, increase rather 
than decrease taxpayers' work incentives. This would be true if the "income effect" of the 
rate increase overwhelmed the "substitution effect." See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX 
POLICY 76 (5th ed. 1987). 
There is no a priori basis for deciding how the individual income tax affects work 
incentives. On the one hand, the tax reduces the financial rewards of greater effort 
and thus tends to discourage work (the substitution effect). On the other hand, it 
may provide a greater incentive to obtain more income because it reduces the in­
come left for spending (the income effect). 
Id. Taking both of these effects into consideration, however, it is quite possible that changes 
in federal income tax rates have little net effect on taxpayers' work incentive because the 
decisions whether to work, how much to work, and what career to pursue are influenced 
primarily by factors other than taxes. 
Taxation is only one of many factors affecting work incentives. This makes it ex­
tremely difficult to interpret the available statistical evidence or the results of direct 
interviews with taxpayers. The evidence suggests that income taxation does not 
greatly reduce the amount of labor supplied by workers and managers who are the 
primary family earners. Work habits are not easily changed, and for most people 
. . .  there is little opportunity to vary their hours of work or the intensity of their 
efforts in response to changes in tax rates. 
Id. Pechman also notes that "secondary earners" in a household have greater opportunity to 
vary their work effort in response to tax-rate changes than do "primary earners." He con­
cludes, however, that, although the evidence is mixed, "[t]he historical trends in the U.S. 
labor supply do not . . .  support the view that taxes have had a significant effect on aggregate 
labor supply." Id. at 77. Some investment decisions other than the work-leisure tradeoff 
probably are influenced significantly by income tax considerations: for example, whether to 
invest in taxable or tax-exempt securities. 
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would. 11ris is because the retroactive portion of the rate increase 
will have no distortive effects on taxpayers' incentives. For exam­
ple, it will not distort taxpayers' choice between work and leisure 
because it is essentially a surtax on income earned in the past.138 
Even the cleverest taxpayers cannot change their past actions. 
Then, given the revenue raised by the retroactive portion of the 
rate increase, the prospective portion of the rate increase can be 
commensurately lower than it otherwise would have been. Thus, 
the distortive effects of the prospective rate increase are reduced. 
As Professor Levmore puts it, "taxing past transactions means that 
future behavior may be less distorted by taxes because the rates 
applicable to the future can be lower than without the retroactive 
tax."139 On this theory, the 1993 retroactive rate increase may have 
been more efficient than a nominally prospective rate increase 
designed to produce the same amount of tax revenue would have 
been. 
The benefits of applying tax-rate increases retroactively, how­
ever, should not be overstated. To produce the desired efficiency 
effects, Congress would have to promise credibly that it would 
never enact a retroactive rate increase again or at least not for a 
long time. Without such a credible commitment, taxpayers would 
alter their behavior in anticipation of future retroactive rate in­
creases, thereby reducing and perhaps eliminating the efficiency 
benefits of the initial retroactive tax.140 What's more, taxpayers 
may be less likely to believe Congress's commitment if it comes on 
the heels of the first surprise retroactive tax.141 
138. See Levmore, supra note 13, at 273. 
139. Id. Levmore's analysis seems to assume a large one-time retroactive tax that is not 
attached to a nominally prospective rate increase. See id. at 276 ("a onetime, large-scale 
(progressive) expropriation of private property"). 
140. Levmore acknowledges this qualification. See id. at 274, 276. He responds, how­
ever, that even if the retroactive tax is only a partial surprise (it surprises only some taxpay­
ers) there still will be some efficiency gains. See id. True enough. However, having been hit 
once with a "bolt from the blue," id. at 277, and knowing that Congress will be tempted to try 
the same trick again, taxpayers will begin to watch the sky for the next one. This is the 
quintessential example of the time-consistency problem. See Stanley Fischer, Dynamic In­
consistency, Cooperation and the Benevolent Dissembling Government, 2 J. EcoN. DYNAMICS 
& CoNTROL 93 (1980) (demonstrating the benefits of credible government commitment to 
optimal tax-policy plan); Kydland & Prescott, supra note 54. Moreover, given the salience of 
the first retroactive tax, taxpayers may have a tendency to overestimate the chance of its 
reoccurrence. To avoid these problems, a credible precommitment device is needed. Per­
haps the new House rule, adopted by the House of Representatives following the RRA that 
prevents consideration of retroactive income tax rate increases, is just such a commitment 
device. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. 
141. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 576 ("To a large degree, expectations concerning fu­
ture government policy will depend on past decisions, so consistent action over time can be 
quite important in fostering desired expectations."). 
March 1996] Retroactivity and Government Precommitment 1173 
One might expect that the larger the initial retroactive tax is the 
harder it would be for Congress to convince taxpayers that it would 
not happen again. At the same time, however, the retroactive tax 
must be sufficiently large to be worth the trouble. That is, if the 
retroactive tax were relatively small, the efficiency benefit would 
likewise be small because a small retro-tax would fund only a small 
reduction in prospective rates. For example, consider the individual 
rate increase included in the RRA 1993, which was only 3.6 per­
centage points. It is difficult to imagine that, by applying that rate 
increase nominally prospectively, the increase would have needed 
to be considerably larger to generate the same amount of revenue. 
If, however, the rate increase were extraordinarily large, there 
might be efficiency gains to a nominally retroactive effective 
date.142 Even then, given the offsetting income and substitution ef­
fects, it is unclear whether there would be any efficiency gains. 
Moreover, if we take into account the negative public reaction 
to the nominally retroactive rate increase in 1993, and we consider 
all the time and resources spent debating the issue and explaining it 
to an mcredulous public, the overall costs of the retroactive effec­
tive date probably exceed the benefits. In response to taxpayer and 
lawmaker complaints about the effective date, some of the revenue 
that was generated by the retroactive application of the rate in­
crease was given right back to taxpayers via a special transition­
relief provision. Under that provision, individuals whose 1993 in­
come taxes were increased as a result of the rate change could elect 
to pay the additional tax in three equal installments in 1994, 1995, 
and 1996.143 
3. The Shift From an Income Tax to a Consumption Tax 
The competing concerns of optimal distribution and optjmal in­
centives must be balanced not only whenever Congress considers 
raising federal income tax rates but also whenever it considers any 
sort of broad-based tax transition. Another such transition would 
be the shift from the current income tax to a broad-based consump­
tion tax. In discussions of the transitional problems· that such a shift 
presents, commentators often consider two general types of transi-
142. For example, the potential efficiency benefits of nominal retroactivity were substan­
tially greater with the large rate increases of 1938 and 1944 than with the relatively small rate 
increase of 1993. See supra notes 133-34. 
143. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13201(d), 107 Stat. 
416, 459-61 (codified at I.R.C. § 1 (1996)). 
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tion effects: "price changes" and "carryover problems."144 The 
price-change issue is what I have been discussing all along: what to 
do about the reduction in the value of taxpayers' pretransition in­
vestments caused by the loss of preferential tax treatment of those 
investments. In the shift to a broad-based consumption tax or a so­
called fiat tax, many incentive subsidies would presumably be re­
pealed. With respect to those transitions, the arguments in Parts II 
and III regarding the optimal transition policy would apply. Full 
transition relief should be given to the nominal beneficiaries of the 
repealed subsidies. 
The carryover problem, however, is somewhat different and is 
best defined by example. The carryover problem that has received 
the most attention involves the question of how to deal with the 
following situation: Under an income tax regime, an individual tax­
payer accumulates wealth on an after-tax basis, that is, the initial 
investment was made from after-tax dollars and the earnings on 
that investment are taxed as accrued. Then, following the switch to 
a consumption tax, the individual begins to draw on this pretransi­
tion wealth to make consumption expenditures. The problem is 
that, if the taxpayer is given no special transition relief, the tax­
payer's post-transition consumption expenditures made with pre­
transition savings will be taxed again. This amounts to a type of 
double taxation or tax penalty on those who did most of their sav­
ing under the income tax, in the following sense: "The combined 
income and [consumption] taxes on an individual caught in the 
transition might be greater than the total taxes which would be im­
posed if all his income, savings, and consumption had taken place 
under either an income tax or [a consumption] tax."145 
The question therefore is whether to provide transition relief to 
taxpayers caught in this position. One response would be to treat 
all pretransition investments as being "tax prepaid" and to exclude 
those assets from being taken into account in determining taxpay­
ers' consumption tax liability under the new tax system. This would 
essentially be a form of grandfather treatment. The response at the 
other end of the spectrum would be to provide no transition relief 
144. This terminology was first used by the Treasury Department in its discussion of tran­
sition issues presented by shifting to a "broadly based tax system," either a broad-based in­
come tax or a broad-based consumption tax. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 159-87. The 
distinction has been used subsequently and to some extent criticized by tax-policy analysts. 
See Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note 26, at 1649-59 (acknowledging the distinction but 
arguing that the two should be treated analytically as one); Kaplow, supra note 10, at 611-14 
(arguing that the two phenomena merit different treatment). 
145. Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note 26, at 1653-54. For a general discussion of 
several different carryover problems, see BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 160-61. 
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and to treat the pretransition investments as being tax prepaid. 
This would essentially be a form of nominal prospectivity. The 
main difference between these two approaches would be the alloca­
tion of the relative tax burden across various classes of taxpayers. 
The grandfathering or tax-prepayment approach would impose a 
relatively low tax burden on taxpayers who have large accumula­
tions of wealth when the transition occurs and a relatively high tax 
burden on taxpayers whose primary wealth accumulation takes 
place after the transition and whose consumption is not funded pri­
marily from pretransition wealth.146 The nominally prospective ap­
proach would have just the reverse effect. In between these 
approaches, one could imagine a number of possible compromise 
solutions, involving phased-in or delayed effective dates.147 
Whatever proposal is chosen should reflect the government's 
determination of the appropriate distribution of the tax burden 
among individual taxpayers. Thus, it is possible that social welfare 
would be maximized if a transition rule is adopted that results in 
roughly the same allocation of total tax burden as existed before 
the shift from an income to a consumption tax. Alternatively, the 
welfare-maximizing transition rule might increase slightly the tax 
burden on those taxpayers who have substantial amounts of pre­
transition wealth and slightly reduce the tax burden of those who 
have not. 
146. The Treasury Department explains these effects as follows: "[I]f owners were al­
lowed to treat those assets as tax-prepaid, they would receive a gain to the extent they 
planned to use them for future consumption. Future income on past accumulated wealth 
would then be free from future taxes, and the government would have to make up the differ­
ence by raising the tax rate on the remaining consumption regarded as non-pretaxed." 
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 160. 
147. The Treasury Department proposes a tax-prepaid approach, but it also recommends 
a 10-year phase-in period during which taxpayers would be required to calculate their income 
under both the old income tax and under the consumption tax and pay whichever tax liability 
is greater. Then, at the end of the 10-year period, all unrealized capital gains would be sub­
ject to taxation. See id. at 184-85. Graetz contends that the Treasury proposal would pose 
undue administrative burdens, and he seems to suggest that the use of a delayed effective 
date would be a superior alternative. See Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note 26, at 1655-
58. In addition, Graetz suggests that, if the pretransition wealth-accumulation problem must 
be remedied, a better approach would be "an immediate deduction of the basis of assets held 
on the date of enactment (perhaps limited to a maximum dollar amount with a carryover or 
required spread over a period of years)." Id. at 1655. An additional complication is how to 
deal with those pretransition assets that were purchased with before-tax dollars, for example, 
accumulations in pension funds whose original contributions and earnings have been ex­
cluded from the income tax base. If such investments are likewise treated as tax prepaid, 
they would be receiving a subsidy rather than a tax penalty upon the shift to a consumption 
tax. The obvious solution would be to distinguish pretransition assets according to whether 
they were funded by before-tax or after-tax dollars. But this would increase the complexity 
of the system considerably. The increase in administrative costs associated with such a sys­
tem may or may not outweigh the benefits. 
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Note also that under the framework of this article the choice of 
the optimal transition policy for dealing with carryover problems 
depends more upon distributional issues than incentive issues. This 
conclusion is based on the intuition that the failure to provide tran­
sition relief in this context probably will not produce the same de­
gree of default premiums as an opportunistic incentive-subsidy 
transition. That being said, however, it must be admitted that the 
shift from an income tax to a consumption tax, if accompanied by 
no transition relief whatever, conceivably could have significant in­
centive effects, simply because of the potential magnitude of the 
wealth transfer. Taxpayers making future decisions regarding sav­
ings and consumption would not soon forget receiving such a hit 
from the tax collector. In fact, the effect would be similar to that of 
an extremely large income tax rate increase, one that was large 
enough to have a significant immediate impact on the distribution 
of income in society.14s 
V. IMPLEMENTATION 
This Part addresses several specific issues of design that arise 
out of the thesis of the article. Fir�t, I discuss two practical issues 
that must be addressed in the design of an efficient grandfather 
clause. Then I return to the theme of government precommitment, 
and I outline several possible devices through which Congress 
might precommit itself to the tax-transition policy developed in 
Parts Il and IV above. 
A. Designing a Grandfathered Effective Date: The Issues of 
Transferability and "Under-the-Wire" Investments 
Having set forth the basic efficiency argument for guaranteed 
grandfather treatment for incentive subsidies, now let us consider 
two specific design questions: whether the grandfather treatment 
should be transferable and what should be the effective grandfather 
date. The first problem asks whether grandfather treatment should 
be applied to any investment made prior to the enactment date of 
148. Kaplow recognizes an analytical difference between price changes and carryover 
problems; he argues that the former should not receive transition relief for incentive reasons, 
and the latter should receive some type of transition relief for distributional reasons. See 
Kaplow, supra note 10, at 612-14. The difference in my argument is that I would give the 
former full transition relief, at least in connection with incentive-subsidy transitions. My 
analysis of carryover problems and of income tax rate increases also would apply to other 
broad-based tax transitions: for example, the decision to enact an income tax or consump­
tion tax in the first place or the decision to increase the amount of social-security benefits 
that is subject to income taxation. 
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the new law. I refer to grandfather treatment that attaches to the 
investment as transferable grandfathering. Alternatively, grandfa­
ther treatment could be applied only to taxpayers who hold the as­
sets on the date of enactment or some other specified date, thus 
denying the benefits of the new law if the asset is transferred to 
another taxpayer. I refer to grandfather treatment that attaches 
only to the holder on the date of enactment as nontransferable 
grandfathering.149 
An example illustrates the distinction. Assume Congress has 
decided to repeal the exclusion for interest earned on state and lo­
cal bonds, but it also decides to provide grandfather treatment for 
those taxpayers who invested in state and local bonds before the 
repeal. Thus, Congress inserts a grandfathered effective date that 
applies the old tax exemption to income earned on any state and 
local bonds purchased before the date on which the repeal was first 
proposed. If this effective date were made nontransferable, the old 
tax exemption would be available only to those taxpayers who held 
a qualifying tax-exempt bond when the repeal was first proposed. 
Accordingly, if the taxpayer were to sell the bond under this rule, 
the new owner would not get the benefit of the grandfather clause 
but would be taxed on the income she received from the bond. On 
the other hand, if the effective date were made transferable, the 
grandfather treatment would follow the bond to the new owner. 
Hence, interest earned on the bond would be exempt no matter 
who held the bond for as long as the bond generated interest. 
Some commentators have argued that transferable grandfather 
treatment is inappropriate because it results in a windfall to taxpay­
ers who owned the tax-favored assets at the time of the transi­
tion.150 This gain occurs because the value of the · grandfathered 
asset increases relative to the value of other assets of the same type 
that happen to be purchased after the transition and thus do not get 
the benefit of the old incentive subsidy. In the example above, the 
state and local bonds that enjoy the transferable grandfather treat­
ment would, after repeal of the tax exemption, increase in value 
relative to those state and local bonds that did not get grandfather 
treatment. The holder of the grandfathered bonds could sell them 
at a premium. The alternative, however, of using nontransferable 
grandfathering could result in a transition loss to the taxpayers 
149. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 167; Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 53, 60-
63. Graetz refers to nontransferable grandfather clauses as "holder-only grandfathered ef­
fective dates." Id. at 53. 
150. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 167. 
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holding the assets at the time of transition. Under such a rule, the 
taxpayer who owned a tax-exempt bond when the repeal was an­
nounced would continue to enjoy the tax exemption only so long as 
she continued to hold the bond. If, however, she wanted to sell the 
bond, its market value would have fallen relative to the value 
before the repeal because any purchaser of the bond would be sub­
ject to a tax on the bond's interest earnings. 
Under the theory of this article, Congress should decide 
whether the grandfathered effective dates used in connection with 
incentive-subsidy transitions should be made transferable or non­
transferable. The type of analysis that Congress should use in mak­
ing this decision is akin to the analysis that a product manufacturer 
would make in deciding whether to make a warranty transferable or 
nontransferable. If a product manufacturer, for example, were to 
insert a warranty with its product that guaranteed certain parts for 
the life of the product or for as long as the original purchaser owns 
the product, the warranty would be in effect nontransferable. The 
reason a manufacturer would opt for such a warranty, obviously, is 
that the manufacturer would have to pay out fewer claims under its 
warranties. In addition, a nontransferable warranty may be less 
costly to administer. At the same time, the manufacturer would 
hope not to lose so many sales owing to the cheaper, nontransfer­
able warranty that the costs of making it nontransferable exceed the 
benefits. The alternative (a transferable warranty) would require 
more claim payments by the manufacturer but, on net, might pro­
duce greater profits because consumers really may want a transfera­
ble warranty. 
Congress should go through the same cost-benefit analysis when 
deciding whether to make its guarantee of grandfathered effective 
dates transferable or not, and it should announce its decision pub­
licly upon the original enactment of the incentive-subsidy provision. 
This could be done either in the statute itself or in the Joint Com­
mittee report that is published following the enactment of federal 
income tax legislation. If Congress chooses a transferable effective 
date, it then might be able to reduce the amount of the initial incen­
tive subsidy; for example, instead of a 100% exemption for state 
and local bond interest, it could provide a 90% or 80% exemption 
and still induce the desired level of investment in state and local 
bonds. It is still possible, of course, that a nontransferable effective 
date would be the optimal approach. That might be true, for exam­
ple, of incentive-subsidy provisions that are paid to taxpayers over 
long periods of time. In addition, it might be that a transferable 
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effective date would be unduly costly to administer.151 In any 
event, clearly the wrong approach (in the interest of reducing de­
fault premiums and maintaining the integrity of the taxing author­
ity) would be for Congress to give the impression that it would 
provide transferable grandfathering only to change its mind at the 
time of the transition and apply a nontransferable effective date. 
That would be government opportunism. . 
If a grandfathered effective date is to be used, what date should 
be chosen: the date of enactment or some earlier date? If the date 
of enactment is to be used and if taxpayers know this, there sud­
denly will be an enormous incentive (once the transition is being 
considered by Congress but before it has been enacted) for taxpay­
ers to increase their level of investment in the asset that is going to 
lose the preferential tax treatment. This is sometimes called 
"under-the-wire" investment activity, and it can be viewed as a 
form of taxpayer opportunism that the optimal transition policy 
would discourage. With an ideal transition policy, under-the-wire 
investments (those investments that would not have occurred but 
for the imminent repeal of the incentive subsidy) would not receive 
grandfather treatment.152 At the same time, however, grandfather 
treatment should be given to whatever investments were made in 
reliance on the incentive subsidy's existence, so long as that invest­
ment was made prior to the repeal of the subsidy.153 One possibil-
151. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 322 & n.42. 
152. Under-the-wire investments can also be seen in other transition contexts. For exam­
ple, when word gets out that a state government is planning to exercise its power of eminent 
domain to condemn all of the property in a given area for the purpose of building a road, 
landowners in the targeted area may have an increased incentive to build structures on their 
property because of the prospect of increasing the price the government must pay for their 
property. This is a form of moral hazard, and the optimal transition rule would discourage 
such investments. 
Kaplow suggests that there is no analytical difference between what I call under-the-wire 
investing in a tax-favored asset and any other pretransition investment in such an asset. He 
argues that they differ only in degree and thus that neither type of investment should receive 
grandfather treatment. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 608. I think there is an analytical 
difference, which is revealed in the contract analogy. If the government were to enter into a 
contract with a private developer under which the developer was to construct low-income 
housing units, the contract would include specific terms setting forth what is expected of both 
sides, including how many units the government was willing to pay for, a number that the 
government presumably determined to be the optimal amount. If the government later de­
termined that it no longer wanted to buy government housing from this developer, it would 
have to comply with the current contract, but it could decline to enter into future contracts 
with the developer. This is comparable to a transition rule guaranteeing grandfathered effec­
tive dates for incentive-subsidy transitions. Providing grandfather treatment for under-the­
wire investments in the context of an incentive-subsidy transition, on the other hand, would 
be akin to allowing the developer in the contract example to force the government to reim­
burse it for housing units that were not part of the original contract. 
153. In section III.C supra, I discuss why the enactment date is the appropriate cutoff 
point. 
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ity would be for Congress to try to sort out these two types of 
investments and grandfather the latter but not the former. To do so 
with perfect accuracy, however, would be impossible. So we are left 
to choose among imperfect alternatives. 
Under one approach, grandfather treatment would be provided 
to any investments made before the date on which the repeal of the 
subsidy was first proposed in Congress.154 Any investment made 
before that date would get grandfather treatment; any made after­
ward would not. One benefit of that rule would be its adminis­
trability; it would provide a bright-line test that could readily be 
applied. The problem with the rule, however, is that it is both over­
inclusive and underinclusive. The rule is overinclusive because 
some taxpayers receiving grandfather treatment would have en­
gaged already in a substantial amount of under-the-wire investing 
before that date. Some taxpayers, in other words, will inevitably 
learn of the transition proposal before it is formally announced in 
Congress and will simply make their under-the-wire investments a 
little earlier to circumvent the rule.155 The rule is underinclusive 
because some taxpayers who will be denied grandfather treatment 
(that is, some of those who make investments after the announce­
ment date) will not be engaging in under-the-wire investing at all. 
Those taxpayers' post-announcement investments are not moti­
vated by the imminent repeal of the subsidy. Of course, some 
amount of over- and underinclusiveness is inevitable. And using 
the date on which the proposal was first proposed in Congress 
seems better than any of the other alternatives. A later date would 
probably encourage too much under-the-wire investing, and an ear­
lier date would probably be too difficult to administer.156 
154. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 607-08 & nn.305-06. 
155. One would not be surprised if these taxpayers had expensive tax counsel. 
156. If the overinclusiveness problem were thought to be serious, exceptions could be 
made in certain cases of egregious abuse. For example, if it could be demonstrated that some 
taxpayer suddenly increased her investment in some tax-favored asset by an enonnous 
amount the week before a proposal to repeal the tax preference is introduced in Congress, 
grandfather treatment could be denied. Likewise, with the underinclusiveness problem, ex­
ceptions could be made if taxpayers could prove that their post-announcement investments 
would have been made anyway. Both of these exceptions, however, add complexity and cost 
to the system. 
It is also worth observing that, when an incentive-subsidy provision is enacted, there is 
often a compelling reason to make the provision nominally retroactive to the date on which 
the provision was first proposed. If Congress announces that it is considering enacting a 
particular incentive-subsidy provision, and it announces that the provision will be applied 
nominally prospectively if enacted, there will be a large and inefficient lull (perhaps even a 
total stop) in the type of investment that the subsidy is intended to encourage. This lull will 
begin on the date the proposal is announced and will end on the effective date of its enact­
ment, as taxpayers who have been waiting to get the benefit of the subsidy suddenly rush to 
make the investment. Because the period between when a subsidy is first proposed and 
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B. Congressional Precommitment Devices 
Once we have identified the optimal transition policy for tax 
transitions, the next challenge is to develop a mechanism by which 
the government can credibly commit itself to this policy. Without 
an effective precommitment device, the incentive effects of any 
transition policy disappear.1s7 As an initial matter, however, one 
might reasonably question the need for a government precommit­
ment device, on the theory that the democratic political process and 
electoral accountability should be sufficient to ensure that the gov­
ernment will always apply the optimal transition policy. For exam­
ple, if Congress were to deliberate over whether to repeal the low­
income-housing credit and whether to provide grandfather protec­
tion for those who had invested in reliance on the credit, those tax­
payers who had relied on the credit would have an incentive to 
lobby the tax-writing committees to insert such a transition rule. In 
addition to the effects of private lobbying, the overall effect of alter­
native transition policies on the government's reputation,and integ­
rity may help to keep lawmakers in line. After all, at some later 
date (or perhaps even in the same session of Congress) those 
lawmakers may want to enact a new incentive subsidy to replace 
the old one; they therefore want to minimize the default premium . .  
For all of these reasons, members of Congress have a strong incen­
tive to avoid even the appearance of opportunistic behavior. 
So where's the problem? As I suggested in Part II, there may 
not be a problem. It is conceivable that, for the reasons just de­
scribed, lawmakers already have adequate incentives not to act op­
portunistically and instead have incentives to choose the optimal 
effective date for every type of tax transition. In other words, it is 
entirely possible that the assumption in Part II of congressional my­
opia is unfounded. If so, if Congress already is pursuing the optimal 
transition policy with respect to tax transitions, then this article 
serves to clarify and make explicit the justification for that practice 
and to suggest reasons why that transition policy should be solidi­
fied and publicized. 
when it is enacted and made effective sometimes can be quite long, Congress will often make 
the subsidy retroactive to the date on which it was first proposed; that transition rule will be 
announced from the very beginning, so that taxpayers will not have an incentive to wait for 
enactment before making the investment. 
157. See generally Shepsle, supra note 2, at 246·47, 250-57 (discussing, in general terms, 
the efficiency benefits of, and outlining several approaches to, "disabling" the government's 
discretionary policymaking authority). Kaplow notes that there are incentive benefits to the 
government's credibly precommitting to an optimal transition policy; however, he argues that 
the optimal transition policy generally is not to provide transition relief. See Kaplow, supra 
note 10, at 576. 
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It may be the case, however, that there is a problem or at least 
the potential for one. First, it has been suggested that, in choosing 
effective dates for tax transitions, Congress follows "no discernible 
principle" or pattern.158 If that is true, then Congress is not follow­
ing any single coherent transition policy but is instead making tran­
sition decisions on an ad hoc basis. Second, as discussed in Part II, 
it is probably safe to say that lawmakers are like the rest of us and 
sometimes fail fully to consider the long-run effects of their deci­
sions on the integrity of the government.159 Certainly, lawmakers 
will be tempted from time to time to act opportunistically, perhaps 
when the need for additional revenue is especially acute (for exam­
ple, during a movement for tax reform or deficit reduction) or when 
the public's attention is not focused on the decision or when, for 
whatever reason, the party that stands to suffer the transition loss 
lacks political clout. Therefore, one of the principal aims of this 
article is to emphasize the need for lawmakers in all of these situa­
tions to take into account the full costs associated with failing to 
provide adequate transition relief. Moreover, because of the possi­
bility of this sort of temptation, it is worth considering additional 
ways in which we might limit the government's ability to give in to 
it.160 Indeed, just such a concern, which persists despite the con­
straints imposed by the normal political process, explains our deci­
sion to make the government subject to contract-law principles. 
That being said, let us now consider a number of devices that 
might be used to raise the cost to Congress of changing its mind 
regarding what transition rule to apply to a given tax transition. 
Some of these devices may currently be in use or may have been 
tried in the past, although they may not have been understood in 
these terms. Others have not yet been tried and should be. For 
purposes of this article, we shall concentrate on commitment de­
vices that might be used by Congress in connection with changes to 
incentive-subsidy provisions in the Internal Revenue Code as well 
as some other types of tax transitions. It bears reemphasizing, how­
ever, that versions of these devices could be used just as readily by 
other levels of government in connection with other types of legal 
transitions. 
158. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 48. 
159. See Kydland & Prescott, supra note 54, at 474. 
160. But see Kirk J. Stark, The Elusive Transition to a Tax Transition Policy and the Role 
for a Grandfather Rules Budget, AM. J. TAX POLY. (forthcoming 1996) (arguing that congres­
sional precommitment is unlikely to work, given the history of frequent tax-Jaw changes and 
given structural changes in congressional committees which allow more input by more di­
verse parties than previously). 
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1. Contract Law: Lessons From the Winstar Case 
Contract law could provide a way to force the government to 
shoulder the costs of opportunistic tax transitions. One could allow 
taxpayers harmed by the repeal or elimination of an incentive sub­
sidy to sue for damages under a breach-of-contract theory. The ap­
propriate remedy would presumably be expectation damages or 
some approximation thereof, which could be calculated by deter­
mining what the relying party's return would have been had the 
incentive subsidy not been repealed or, alternatively, had the sub­
sidy been repealed but grandfathered. Making such damage calcu­
lations would be no simple task. But it would be no more difficult 
than making damage calculations in other contract disputes. In ad­
dition, as I- suggested in section III.C above, the difficulties inherent 
in determining who would be entitled to recover in the event of a 
repealed subsidy would be no greater than the difficulties inherent 
in determining who is entitled to recover in any complex contrac­
tual dispute. 
A recent decision by the Federal Circuit provides some insight 
into how contract law can be used to hold Congress and its agents 
to their commitments. In Winstar Corp. v. United States,161 the Fed­
eral Circuit, upholding the Court of Claims, essentially found that 
Congress, through the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) 
and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), 
had entered into contracts with a number of savings-and-loan insti­
tutions ("thrifts") and that Congress had broken those contracts. 
What is interesting for current purposes is that the nature of the 
events that gave rise to those contracts were not terribly different 
from the circumstances surrounding the use of any incentive 
subsidy. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, interest rates were extremely 
high and many thrifts were on the brink of insolvency, in part be­
cause of long-term fixed-loan obligations entered into during peri­
ods of relatively low interest rates. As a result, instead of enacting 
a direct subsidy payment to the failing thrifts or taking them over 
and running them directly, the FHLBB and FSLIC offered special 
regulatory-accounting treatment to any healthy thrift that would 
merge with a failing thrift. The special accounting treatment effec­
tively allowed those thrifts that responded to the inducement to 
treat certain assets of the ailing thrift (the so-called supervisory 
goodwill) as regulatory capital, thereby making it easier for the ac-
161. 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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quiring thrifts to satisfy regulatory solvency requirements. I call 
this the "Winstar subsidy." A number of healthy thrifts responded 
to the inducement: They applied to the FHLBB for approval of 
their plans to merge with ailing thrifts; after a series of negotiations, 
the Bank Board approved the plans, and the mergers took place. 
In 1989, however, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),162 
which included, among many other things, a provision that essen­
tially eliminated the Winstar subsidy. Furthermore, and what is 
most important for the purposes of this article, Congress in the 
FIRREA provided no transition relief for those thrifts that had re­
lied upon the subsidy. Therefore, as a result of the FIRREA, many 
thrifts were thrown into noncompliance with regulatory-solvency 
requirements. Some of the thrifts so harmed, including the Winstar 
Corporation, sued the United States in the Court of Claims, alleg­
ing that the provision in the FIRREA which eliminated the Winstar 
subsidy amounted to a breach of contract. The Court of Claims 
held for the thrifts, and the Federal Circuit agreed. 
The holding in these cases is consistent with the framework of 
this article. Had the courts reached the opposite conclusion and 
had the government been permitted to renege on its deals with the 
thrifts, there probably would have been serious consequences for 
the future use of incentive subsidies. Any future attempt by Con­
gress or its agents to use accounting subsidies to induce financial 
institutions to change their investment decisions would require a 
substantial default premium. Moreover, if the courts had held in 
favor of the government, commercial parties in many contexts (not 
just thrifts faced with favorable accounting rules) would suddenly 
become more suspicious of government promises of future benefits 
and likely would demand a substantial default premium before act­
ing in reliance on government inducements.163 
162. Financial Institutions Refonn, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in relevant part at 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994)). 
163. One commentator has argued that the Winstar court's reasoning was deeply flawed 
because it failed to recognize that the original incentive subsidy (the special accounting treat­
ment promised for healthy thrifts that merged with ailing ones) was a mistake from the start 
and that Congress, in passing the FIRREA, "was right to negate these deals." Jonathan R. 
Macey, Rule of Law: The Court Gets It Half Right on Firrea, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1995, at 
Al3. It is unclear whether the author would apply the same reasoning to government con­
tracts. If so, the analysis would seem to suggest that the government should have the right to 
annul any government contract that it detennines ex post to have been ill-advised, without 
having to pay damages. In addition, the author at times seems to suggest that government 
"bureaucrats" should not have been in charge of detennining which thrifts received the 
favorable accounting treatment: "Congress [when enacting FIRREA] should have gone 
much further and relieved all federal bureaucrats of the power to cut special deals with par­
ticular favored constituents." Id. But that argument proves too much; under similar reason-
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The holding in Winstar, of course, does not imply that contract 
law should necessarily apply to the repeal of a generic incentive 
subsidy, such as an incentive tax credit. There are potentially im­
portant differences between the subsidy in the Winstar case and a 
tax credit. For starters, in the Winstar situation, each applicant for 
the accounting subsidy was required to negotiate the deal with the 
government via the Bank Board in advance of any merger. Thus, 
the subsidy was structured very much like a traditional government 
contract. The enactment of a tax credit, however, does not neces­
sarily require negotiation on a taxpayer-by-taxpayer basis. 
Fair enough. Neither the magnitude nor the relevance of this 
difference should be overstated, however. First, many business tax­
payers do, in effect, seek preapproval of some types of tax subsi­
dies. This can be seen, for example, in taxpayers' requests for 
private-letter rulings from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), rul­
ings that are often considered necessary by taxpayers before they 
will enter into certain tax-favored transactions. Likewise, with re­
spect to some incentive tax subsidies, the Treasury Department 
promulgates detailed regulations setting forth specific requirements 
that must be met by any taxpayer who seeks the benefit of the sub­
sidy. Given these facts, the difference between the incentive tax 
subsidy and the Winstar subsidy seem less obvious. 
Consider the following scenario: Congress enacts an incentive 
subsidy in the form of a tax credit; the Treasury Department issues 
regulations detailing the requirements that a taxpayer must satisfy 
in order to receive the credit; and the IRS issues numerous rulings 
explaining how the credit will apply in many different specific fac­
tual situations. Unsurprisingly, some taxpayers act in reliance on 
the regulations and rulings and make some investments expecting 
to receive the credit. If, at that point, Congress were to repeal the 
credit without providing grandfather treatment, the resulting transi­
tion losses would be quite similar to the damages suffered by the 
plaintiffs in Winstar. 
Even if, however, one is persuaded that the economics of the 
Winstar subsidy are not substantially different from the economics 
of other incentive subsidies, to apply the holding of Winstar to the 
repeal of an incentive tax subsidy might require a change in the 
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area. Under the "unmis-
ing, Congress should never delegate authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the federal 
government, merely because of the possibility that "special deals" might result. Elsewhere in 
the article, however, the author appears to agree with the Federal Circuit's holding in Winstar 
that the government must pay contract damages. See id. 
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takability doctrine," as it has been applied, the enactment of an in­
centive subsidy may not be considered an action by Congress 
expressly intended to bind future congresses.164 What if, however, 
upon enacting an incentive tax credit, Congress were to insert lan­
guage of the following sort: Any taxpayer who acts in reliance on 
this incentive credit and who claims the credit on her federal in­
come tax return will have a contractual right to that credit so long 
as the credit is in force and has not been repealed as of the time the 
investment is made; this right will be enforceable against the U.S. 
government. Arguably, such a contract would be enforceable.165 
2. Formal and Informal Procedural Changes in Congress 
If one rejects the use of contract law as a congressional precom­
mitment device in this context, there are other potential means of 
binding Congress to keep its commitments. Congress could insti­
tute formal or informal procedures that would impose roadblocks 
to changing the tax laws in ways that are inconsistent with the opti­
mal transition policy. In the context of incentive-subsidy transi­
tions, Congress could adopt formal or informal rules that prevent 
the enactment of legislation that would repeal or substantially re­
duce any existing incentive subsidies unless grandfathered effective 
dates were also provided. The one exception to this rule would be 
any change in tax provisions that can easily be defended as a mea­
sure designed to correct an obvious error of the sort described in 
section IV.A above. Such a transition policy could be implemented 
through a change in the House or Senate rules. For example, the 
following rule could be adopted: 
Any legislation that would repeal or cut back an incentive subsidy 
must include a grandfathered effective date. If, however, it is demon­
strated that the legislation is necessary to correct an obviously errone­
ous taxpayer interpretation of the prior law, and if the legislation 
designed to make this correction is submitted to Congress within one 
year of the enactment of the prior law, no grandfathering is necessary. 
Furthermore, in situations involving corrections of obvious errors of 
this sort, the effective date will be made nominally retroactive to the 
date of enactment of the original provision.166 
164. See Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 51-
54 (1986); see also Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1546-47. 
165. Under the Winstar holding, if Congress were then to repeal the incentive tax credit 
without providing transition relief, arguably the U.S. government could be sued in contract. 
Moreover, consistent with Winstar, legislation repealing such a credit would not be exempted 
from contract principles by the "sovereign-acts" doctrine. See Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1548-50. 
166. If this rule seems too strict, it could be changed as follows: If legislation repealing or 
cutting back an incentive-subsidy provision does not include a grandfathered effective date 
and does not satisfy the "error-correction" exception, it must be passed by a three-fifths vote 
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This formulation presents some obvious difficulties, which I dis­
cussed in section IV.A above. The benefits of such a provision may, 
however, be more than offsetting. 
The House of Representatives recently adopted a rule that is 
similar to the one suggested above but that is directed at income tax 
rate increases. The rule prevents consideration of a "bill, joint reso­
lution, [or] amendment . . . carrying a retroactive Federal income 
tax rate increase."167 As suggested in the previous Part, this rule 
could indeed be efficient, as it gives taxpayers some measure of as­
surance that Congress will not d� again what it did in 1993; namely, 
enact a nominally retroactive rate increase. The House also 
adopted another rule change, one that requires a three-fifths vote 
rather than the normal majority vote to enact a tax increase. The 
new rule provides, specifically, as follows: "No bill, joint resolution, 
amendment, or conference report carrying an income tax rate in­
crease could be considered as passed or agreed to unless so deter­
mined by a vote of not less than three-fifths of the members 
voting. "168 This provision has provoked considerable criticism from 
legal academics, primarily from scholars of constitutional iaw.169 
The principal criticism is that the change in the House rules is in­
consistent with the text, structure, and history of the Constitution 
and inconsistent with past congressional practice. I leave those is­
sues for now to the constitutional scholars and congressional his­
torians.170 Instead, I want to emphasize the potential efficiency 
benefit of the new House rule, a benefit derived from the effect of 
the rule on taxpayers' expectations about future changes in federal 
income tax rates. Although, as I suggested in section IV.B.1, most 
income tax rate increases probably do not significantly distort work 
incentives, they do distort them some. To the extent the new House 
rule reduces the likelihood of rate increases or at least reduces the 
likelihood of extremely large rate increases, these distortions are 
rather than a nonnal majority of lawmakers. Also, Congress could create a list of Code 
provisions that qualify as "tax subsidies," much as it has done with tax expenditures. The 
fonner list would likely be shorter than the latter because it would include only those tax­
expenditure provisions that are designed for their incentive effect (that is, for their effect on 
taxpayers' investment decisions) and not those that are primarily redistributive in nature. 
167. H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106 (1995). 
168. H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106 (1995). 
169. See Comment, An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539 (1995) 
(calling for reconsideration of the resolution regarding three-fifths-vote requirement) (signed 
by 17 Jaw professors). 
170. See also John 0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Leg­
islative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483 (1995) (defending the 
constitutionality of the three-fifths-vote requirement). 
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mitigated, and allocative efficiency is enhanced. In addition, the 
new rule will reduce the number of rate changes over time, which 
will reduce the administrative costs associated with frequent Code 
revisions, not the least of which are fees paid to attorneys and 
accountants.171 
If, for whatever reason, formal procedural rules are shunned, a 
similar precommitment function could be served by the congres­
sional tax-writing committees. Thus, for example, the House Com­
mittee on Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committee 
could serve the function of strengthening and enforcing the institu­
tional presumption in favor of grandfathering significant changes to 
incentive-subsidy provisions.172 If those committees were to adopt 
an informal practice of requiring grandfather clauses to be attached 
to all amendments to incentive-subsidy provisions, with the excep­
tion of corrective legislation mentioned above, and if this practice 
were made known to taxpayers, default premiums could be reduced 
significantly.113 
3. Allocating Authority to the Treasury Department and the IRS 
The allocation of decisionmaking authority by Congress to ad­
ministrative agencies can be seen as an important type of precom­
mitment technique. When Congress delegates authority to an 
agency, it does so for two general reasons: (a) to put a particular 
type of decision in the hands of experts who have the training and 
the time to do the job properly and (b) to give the decisionmaking 
authority to individuals who are relatively free from the influences 
171. Another example of a procedural rule designed to limit Congress's legislative discre­
tion is the Gramm-Rudman Act. See generally Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: 
The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 593 (1988). Of course, the ultimate 
rule of this sort would be a constitutional amendment requiring Congress to provide transi­
tion relief in these contexts. See, e.g., supra note 132 (citing proposals to amend the Constitu­
tion to prohibit retroactive tax rate increases). 
172. See Shepsle, supra note 2, at 256 (arguing that a "division of labor committee system 
• . .  enables credible public commitments because it disables discretion of momentary majori­
ties"); id. at 254-57. 
173. Again, this may already be the practice of congressional committees most of the 
time. If so, the practice should be clearly articulated and publicized. One example of this 
practice occurred during recent hearings of the Ways and Means Committee when Commit­
tee Chairman Bill Archer stated publicly that no "loophole" would be reported out of com­
mittee unless accompanied by equivalent revenue offsets. See Archer Says No to "Rifleshots" 
at Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals, 68 TAX NoTES 239 (1995). One commentator has 
noted that congressional precommitment via the committee structure has become more diffi­
cult in recent decades because of procedural reforms that serve to "open" the tax-writing 
process to more interested parties than before. Stark, supra note 160. If that is so, this article 
sheds light on one significant cost of such a trend: the increased default-premium effect re­
sulting from Congress's reduced ability to make credible precommitments in the tax area. 
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of politics.174 It is the latter reason that I want to emphasize. The 
model of this sort of delegation is the allocation of control over the 
money supply to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.115 The Board is a semi-independent body, consisting of 
seven members appointed by the President with the advice and con­
sent of the Senate for staggered fourteen-year terms.176 A member 
who has served a full term may not be reappointed.111 One of the 
principal justifications for allocating so much power to such an insu­
lar group is the perceived need to remove the control of the money 
supply from the influence of everyday politics.178 Specifically, if 
elected politicians, whether they be congresspersons or the Presi­
dent, were to maintain direct control over the money supply, they 
would inevitably be tempted to exercise that control in a manner 
that would maximize their chances of winning reelection but that 
undermined the long-run value to the economy of maintaining a 
stable money supply.179 To prevent this type of abuse, the authority 
is entrusted to a group of well-respected economic experts who are 
unlikely to be aligned with any particular politician and whose pro­
fessional reputations depend largely upon their ability to maintain 
the long-run integrity of the money supply and the overall stability 
of the economy.180 
As with the Federal Reserve Board, it is possible to understand 
the Treasury Department and the IRS as precommitment devices. 
Congress allocates a great deal of decisionmaking authority to the 
Treasury Department and in turn to the Service. 'Ii'easury is em­
powered by section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code to issue reg­
ulations interpreting virtually any provision in the Code.181 This 
authority is quite broad, and, although the regulations promulgated 
under this statutory grant do not technically have the same binding 
174. Another, perhaps more realistic way of describing the second reason for delegation 
is this: to allow Congress to avoid political accountability for hard decisions that must be 
made. I do not focus on that justification in this article. 
175. See generally ALFRED BROADDUS, A PRIMER ON TiiE FED (1988). 
176. See id. at 14. 
177. See id. 
178. See id. ("The purpose of this [14-year] term of office is to insulate members from 
routine day-to-day political pressures."). 
179. See, e.g, Kenneth Rogoff, Reputation, Coordination, and Monetary Policy, in MOD­
ERN BusINESs CYcLE THEORY 236 (Robert J. Barro ed., 1989) (demonstrating the benefits of 
credible government commitment to optimal monetary policy). 
180. All of this is not to say that the Board of Governors is entirely independent of Con­
gress or the President. Together, Congress and the President could abolish the Fed, just as 
they created it, by statute. Moreover, there is a strong expectation that the Board will follow 
a monetary policy that is generally consistent with the current fiscal policy. 
181. See I.R.C. § 7805 (1996). 
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effect as the Code itself, as a practical matter, they have some bind­
ing effect for most taxpayers most of the time. In addition, some­
times when Congress enacts a new tax provision, it will insert a 
specific grant of regulatory authority, empowering the Treasury to 
issue regulations that are just as authoritative as the Code itself. 
The Service also issues rulings of various types that provide a 
statement of how it will interpret specific Code provisions in certain 
circumstances. These rulings are sometimes issued publicly in the 
form of published revenue rulings. They are also sometimes issued 
directly to taxpayers as private-letter rulings, informing them how 
the Service would interpret a given Code provision in the taxpayers' 
specific circumstances. Both public and private rulings can be chal­
lenged by taxpayers as inconsistent with the Code; indeed, taxpay­
ers challenge them quite often. Nevertheless, much more often 
taxpayers simply follow the rulings as if they were the law. Finally, 
the Treasury Department and the Service exercise lawmaking 
power in their decisions regarding enforcement practices, that is, 
the decisions concerning where to concentrate tax-enforcement re­
sources, what arguments to make in litigation, how flexible to be in 
settlement negotiations with taxpayers, and on what issues to settle. 
To explain this allocation of decisionmaking authority to the 
Treasury Department and to the Service, most commentators have 
relied primarily on the technical-expertise argument. Because the 
details of tax law are often extremely technical and arcane, it is con­
sidered necessary that a large measure of lawmaking authority be 
given to a group of well-trained and experienced experts in tax law 
and policy. That justification has merit. Nevertheless, another rea­
son to allocate authority to these institutions is the benefit of poli­
cymaking stability over time. Unlike the members of the Federal 
Reserve Board, the high-level officials in the Treasury Department 
and in the IRS essentially serve at the discretion of the President; 
therefore, they are in some ways much more politically accountable 
for their decisions than members of the Fed are. The same techni­
cal nature of the tax field that serves to justify their grant of author­
ity, however, also serves to protect them from political pressure. 
Most of the regulations and rulings interpreting the tax laws go un­
noticed entirely by members of Congress. In addition, the people 
who are chosen to staff the high-level positions in the Treasury 
Department and in the Service, with the exception of the Secretary 
of Treasury, are almost always tax professionals, either tax lawyers 
or tax-law professors who have devoted their careers to under­
standing the tax laws and whose long-run professional success de-
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pends upon their reputations as tax experts and not their ability to 
carry out political agendas.182 
Perhaps Congress should, for precommitment reasons, increase 
the extent to which it delegates lawmaking authority to the Treas­
ury Department and the Service, particularly in the area of incen­
tive subsidies. Although a fully developed proposal along these 
lines is beyond the scope of this article, the basic outline of the idea 
should be obvious. The Treasury Department and the Service 
would be given a greater role in the design of such incentive subsi­
dies as the incentive tax credits, as well as in decisions regarding 
whether to extend those credits and under what terms. In wielding 
this new power, the Treasury Department and the Service would be 
acting as an agent of Congress with the mandate to maximize the 
long-run efficiency of the economy, and they would continue to be 
subject to congressional oversight. They, however, would be one 
step removed from the heat of the political forces that sometimes 
cause the sort of government myopia of which Bister and others 
warn.183 Obviously, the tradeoff with such a proposal is that an 
enormous amount of power and control over the disbursement of a 
tremendous amount of government revenue would be placed in the 
hands of nonelected officials. Whether such a delegation would be 
unprecedented in magnitude or scope, however, is unclear. 
4. Built-In Precommitment Devices: Termination Dates and 
Up-Front Subsidies 
In addition to these general precommitment devices, there are 
various ways in which an incentive-subsidy provision could itself be 
designed so as to reduce the likelihood of its opportunistic repeal, 
repeal without transition relief. For starters, when enacting new in­
centive subsidies or when revising old ones, Congress could in­
crease its use of termination dates. With certain types of incentive 
tax provisions, primarily those that are in the form of business cred­
its, Congress commonly inserts a specific termination date. Then, if 
it decides to extend the provision in subsequent years, it does so 
either on a year-by-year basis or on some other periodic basis. For 
example, the research credit typically contains a specific termina-
182. That being said, one of the principal dangers of allocating authority to an agency is 
the risk of capture by the industry being regulated. See generally George J. Stigler, The 
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sa. 3 (1971). Arguably, how­
ever, the Treasury Department and the IRS are less susceptible to capture than a typical 
administrative agency, in part because of the relative size of their constituency. 
183. EISI'ER, supra note 1, at 87-103. 
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tion date that is one year from the previous date of extension;1B4 
thus, if the credit is to remain in effect, Congress must vote every 
year to extend it. In contrast, in 1990, Congress extended the termi­
nation date of the alcohol-fuel credit from December 31, 1992, to 
December 31, 2000.185 In some instances, credits that have been 
subject to specific termination dates are made "permanent," which 
simply means that, to repeal the provision in the future, instead of 
just allowing the provision to expire, Congress must pass a law to 
repeal it.186 
With an explicit termination date in effect, it becomes much 
more difficult for Congress to act opportunistically. Because the 
effective date of the termination is set in advance, the taxpayer can 
read for itself whether the provision will apply to a particular in­
vestment. Moreover, it is almost inconceivable that Congress 
would decide to apply the termination retroactively when the termi­
nation date arrives.187 That would be tantamount to the sort of ex­
treme opportunism described in the government-contract example 
above, which Congress is likely to find unpalatable.188 Indeed, fail­
ure to leave the subsidy in effect at least until the stated termination 
date looks very much like a breach of our express contract. There­
fore, an explicit termination date, in effect, serves as a guaranteed 
grandfathered effective date in the event the provision is not ex­
tended. How long the optimal termination period will be (one year 
or several years) is an empirical question that Congress would have 
to decide in each case.189 
Next, Congress could increase its use of up-front incentive subsi­
dies and reduce its use of installment subsidies.190 In the absence of 
184. See I.R.C. § 41(h) (1996). 
185. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-480 
(codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.). 
186. Before 1978, the investment tax credit had always been "temporary" in the sense 
that it always had included a termination date. In 1978, however, Congress made the ITC 
"permanent," which meant that the credit would remain in force until specific legislation was 
enacted to repeal or reduce it. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, 
2824 (codified in scattered sections of l.R.C.). 
187. Although it is fairly common for Congress to extend termination dates or even to 
make them "permanent," I have been unable to find a single example of Congress prema­
turely repealing a provision that had an explicit termination date. 
188. Graetz recommends increased use of termination dates, but for a different purpose. 
He sees them as a means of putting taxpayers on notice that they should expect the tax laws 
to change and therefore should take that fact into account. See Graetz, supra note 9, at 87. 
189. A one-year period may be insufficient in some circumstances. For example, the leg­
islative history of the 1978 Act states that the reason the ITC was made permanent was that 
the uncertainty created by the "temporary" status was reducing the effectiveness of the ITC 
as an incentive device. See S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1978). 
190. For a definition of these terms, see supra Part I. 
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a precommitment to 'provide guaranteed grandfatheririg, it can be 
argued that an up-front subsidy will give rise to a smaller default 
premium than an installment subsidy. If an installment subsidy is 
repealed, serious transition losses can occur· even if the repeal is 
made nominally prospective, that is, in the absence of grandfather­
ing. On the other hand, if an up-front subsidy is repealed, the use 
of a nominally prospective effective date would provide substantial, 
if not full, transition protection for those who had invested in reli­
ance on the provision. Put differently, an up-front subsidy essen­
tially comes with a built-in grandfather clause. Hence, to make the 
repeal of an up-front incentive subsidy nominally retroactive, Con­
gress would essentially have to enact a special nominally retroactive 
tax designed to recapture the benefit previously conferred. Con­
gress would be somewhat more reluctant to enact such a recapture 
tax than to enact a nominally prospective repeal of an installment 
subsidy.191 
Kaplow also observed that up-front subsidies contain built-in 
grandfather treatment.192 In keeping with his general position 
against transition relief, however, Kaplow concludes that the up­
front design of incentive subsidies should be avoided.193 Goldberg 
also recognizes the difference between up-front subsidies and in­
stallment subsidies or, to use his terms, "one-time" and "periodic" 
subsidies. Unlike Kaplow, however, Goldberg extols the built-in 
grandfather feature of up-front subsidies.194 He goes on, however, 
to suggest that periodic subsidies will always be inefficient.195 In 
my view, that claim goes too far. Although installment subsidies 
present a potential default-premium problem, it still is conceivable 
that the installment design, on balance, could be more efficient than 
the up-front design, just as a contract that is structured so that pay-
191. Golberg asserts that once an up-front subsidy has been enacted it cannot be repealed 
retroactively. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 310. He also argues that "a one-time [up­
front] subsidy is completely predictable because there is 100% certainty that it will be ob­
tained." Id. at 327. Whereas, he contends that an installment subsidy "can never attain that 
level of predictability so long as there is a risk of uncompensated termination." Id. 
Although, as explained in the text that follows, I agree generally that up-front subsidies pro­
duce smaller default premiums than installment subsidies do, I think Goldberg overstates the 
case a bit. 
192. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 587. 
193. See id. ("Thus, the analysis of grandfather provisions should be applied to initial 
program design decisions concerning the appropriate timing of taxes and subsidies. Pro­
grams typically should not be designed so as to incorporate grandfathering, because it is 
generally undesirable." (footnote omitted)}. 
194. See Goldberg, supra note 12. 
195. See id. at 306 ("Periodic subsidies are inefficient and are likely to decrease the hori-
zontal equity of the tax' system."). 1 
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men ts are made in installments could be more efficient (that is, pro­
duce more overall wealth for the contracting parties) than a 
contract that is structured so that a single lump-sum payment is 
made up front. For example, budgetary constraints in a particular 
year could make it impossible for Congress to enact an up-front 
incentive subsidy that is sufficiently large to induce the desired 
change in behavior; whereas, an installment subsidy, which spreads 
the payments over a larger number of budgetary periods, could be 
made more generous and therefore more effective.196 Moreover, 
the default-premium effect of the installment design could theoreti­
cally be addressed by a credible government precommitment to 
providing grandfather treatment in the event the installment sub­
sidy is repealed.197 In fact, it is theoretically possible that the most 
efficient means of reducing the default premium is not the up-front 
subsidy but some other form of grandfathering. 
Thus, enacting incentive subsidies with specific termination 
dates or with up-front benefits are ways of decreasing the likelihood 
of retroactive repeal, that is, repeal without transition relief. Put 
differently, when Congress uses those devices, it not only promises 
taxpayers that it will subsidize their investments with an incentive­
tax provision but also signals with a fair degree of credibility that it 
will not renege on the deal. 
CONCLUSION 
As the tax-reform movement gathers momentum, there will be a 
temptation to use transition losses rather than tax-rate increases to 
meet revenue goals. This article has provided an argument for why 
Congress should resist that temptation, at least when the deduction, 
exclusion, or credit being repealed is an incentive subsidy. And it 
has provided an argument for why, in such situations, full transition 
relief in the form of grandfathered effective dates will often be ap­
propriate. Moreover, this article has argued that whenever Con­
gress decides to use an incentive subsidy as a means of altering 
taxpayers' incentives, it should give serious consideration to the op­
timal design of that subsidy. Among the considerations that should 
196. Goldberg suggests that the only purpose served by spreading the cost of a subsidy 
over several budgetary periods is obfuscation, that is, to hide the true cost of the subsidy. 
See id. at 312. Indeed, obfuscation may play a role in the use of installment subsidies. How­
ever, there are economic as well as political reasons to use the installment form. For exam­
ple, the use of the installment subsidy rather than an up-front subsidy of equal expected 
value may permit the government to avoid having to fund the subsidy with deficit financing. 
197. Goldberg seems to disagree with this argument, even as a theoretical matter. See id. 
at 327 ("[Tjhe need for risk premiums for periodic subsidies cannot be avoided."). 
/ 
March 1996] Retroactivity and Government Precommitment 1195 
be taken into account are (a) whether the benefits of the subsidy 
should be paid up front or provided in installments over time, (b) 
whether express termination dates should be used, and ( c) if the 
promise of a grandfathered effective date is to be included, whether 
grandfather treatment will be made transferable or not. In addi­
tion, if Congress finds itself unable keep its implicit or explicit 
promises not to repeal incentive-subsidy provisions without provid­
ing grandfather treatment, some sort of external precommitment 
technique should be considered, whether it be a formal contract, a 
legislative procedural reform, or a delegation of lawmaking author­
ity to the Treasury Department. 
The message of this article, however, is not limited to changes in 
the federal income tax laws. The important similarities between 
government contracts and incentive subsidies and the important dif­
ferences between those two types of government action and other 
types of government action whose effects are less narrowly focused 
apply in nontax settings as well. Some of those nontax settings I 
have mentioned already,198 but the point bears repeating: When­
ever the government makes a policy decision (a change in the law 
or a change in the application of the law or whatever) the relevant 
government decisionmaker should consider the extent to which the 
new decision undermines earlier government commitments and 
therefore hinders the ability to make future commitments. When 
the default-premium effect is potentially large, the decisionmaker 
should consider implementing some form of transition relief. 
I will conclude with an example of potential government oppor­
tunism that looms on the horizon as of this writing. The recent 
budget battles between the Republican-controlled Congress and 
the Democratic White House and the inability of the parties to 
reach a final agreement on a budget have increased the risk that the 
federal government will actually default on its debt obligations. In 
fact, Moody's Investor's Service publicly announced that, because 
of the budget deadlock, it was reviewing nearly $400 billion of U.S. 
Treasury securities for possible downgrade.199 According to one 
Wall Street Journal report, "[i]f the rating agency downgrades U.S. 
debt, which would be an unprecedented ac�ion, it would almost cer­
tainly raise the cost of public borrowing."200 
198. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69. 
199. See Fred Vogelstein, Moody's Puts Treasury Debt Up for Review, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
25, 1996, at Cl. 
200. Christopher Georges & David Rogers, A Compromise is Developing on the Budget, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1996, at A24. 
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If a budget deadlock 'and the threat of default can produce a 
downgrade in the U.S. credit rating, imagine what the effect of an 
actual default would be. A default of that sort would amount to a 
catastrophic form of government opportunism. Notwithstanding 
the recent announcement by Moody's, few experts believe that the 
government will in fact default on its obligations, precisely because 
of the size of the harm that would result.201 In this article I have 
emphasized that a similar sort of risk, the default-premium effect, 
lurks behind many government decisions, and although the magni­
tude of the effect in each case probably is minuscule compared to 
the prospect of a default on the federal debt, in the aggregate, over 
time, the costs may be quite high. Moreover, these may be costs 
that, with some careful attention to the design of an optimal transi­
tion policy, can be substantially reduced. The worst response to 
those costs, however, is to ignore them. 
201. See Vogelstein, supra note 199. 
